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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an analysis of the economic impact of the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) in the textiles and apparel industry in Kenya and South Africa, and answers three 
consecutive questions. First, has AGOA been successful in reinforcing Kenya and South Africa‟s 
reform efforts? Second, has AGOA been successful in facilitating the integration of Kenya and 
South Africa‟s economy into the global economy? Finally, has AGOA been successful in 
promoting employment and poverty reduction in Kenya and South Africa? Using the textiles and 
apparel industry of the two countries as a case study, it was realised that AGOA has achieved 
much success in contributing to the reformation and integration of the economy of Kenya and 
South Africa into the global economy. However, it was found that AGOA‟s success in promoting 
poverty reduction through economic activities such as trade, investment and employment in the 
two countries has been mixed. While AGOA has contributed positively to the promotion of 
economic activities in the textiles and apparel industry in Kenya, the economic problems facing 
the textiles and apparel industry in South Africa has been exacerbated by AGOA.  
This study is important because it draws attention to the economic achievements of AGOA in the 
textiles and apparel industry in Kenya and South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The textiles and apparel industry occupy a prominent economic position, in terms of trade, 
employment and foreign investment, in the economic development of Kenya and South Africa. 
However, the combination of international pressures arising from globalisation as well as 
international commercial policies, including tariff and nontariff barrier reduction on the one 
hand, and national policies on the other, have brought enormous challenges to the contribution of 
the industry to economic development. In this study, globalisation is used in its narrowest sense 
to refer to “the integration of economic activities across borders through markets. The integration 
of economic activities involves free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, thereby 
creating a single market in inputs and outputs and full national treatment for foreign investors 
(and nationals working abroad) so that economically speaking, there are no foreigners.”1 During 
the colonial period, Kenya and South Africa played dual economic roles in the international 
economy. First, they served as markets for natural resource extraction. Second, they served as 
destinations for value-added manufactured goods imported from Europe. After independence, the 
governments of Kenya and South Africa adopted protective tariff barriers and import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) as strategies for promoting the industrialisation, modernisation and 
transformation of economic activities from excessive dependence on natural resource extraction.  
Despite the popularity of ISI, the success chalked up was short lived. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, deteriorating economic conditions in the two countries compelled their government to 
implement what I call „loan for economic reforms.‟ Sanctioned by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the economic recovery programme (ERP) which was 
implemented in these countries to obtain IMF/World Bank support, involved privatisation of 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), deregulation and trade liberalisation. Indeed, the objective of 
the ERP was to promote poverty reduction through the integration of the economy of Kenya and 
South Africa into the global economy. However, years after the implementation of the ERP, 
economic conditions in the two countries remained in decline. To ameliorate the concomitant 
                                                 
1
 Wolf, M. Why Globalisation Works . New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004, 14. 
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effects of economic displacement in the two countries and its effects on other parts of the world 
through globalisation, a second wave of liberal policies were adopted. The African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) is one of those policies. AGOA serves as the first comprehensive 
strategy and an effort by the United States (U.S.) to promote poverty reduction in SSA through 
trade and investment.  
In assessing the achievements of AGOA in Kenya and South Africa, a pertinent question could 
be directed toward the success of the Act in areas such as poverty reduction, and the promotion 
of economic activities in the textiles and apparel industry. Has AGOA been successful in 
reinforcing Kenya and South Africa‟s reform efforts? Has AGOA been successful in facilitating 
the integration of Kenya and South Africa‟s economy into the global economy? Has AGOA been 
successful in promoting employment and poverty reduction in Kenya and South Africa? Using 
the textiles and apparel industry of the two countries as a case study, it was realised that AGOA 
has achieved much success in contributing to the reformation and integration of the economies of 
Kenya and South Africa into the global economy. However, AGOA‟s success in promoting 
poverty reduction through economic activities such as trade, investment and employment in the 
two countries has been mixed. While AGOA has contributed positively to the promotion of 
economic activities in the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya, the economic problems facing 
the textiles and apparel industry of South Africa has been exacerbated by AGOA. 
The objective of this research is to assess the economic impact of AGOA in the textiles and 
apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa through an analysis of the outcome of the interaction 
between the national policies of Kenya and South Africa on the one hand, and AGOA on the 
other. It focuses on the new economic opportunities offered by AGOA for trade and investment 
in Africa, namely, the promotion of duty-free and quota-free trade to the United States (U.S.) – 
one of the largest markets in the world, as well as the promotion of national policies, such as 
employment and export-oriented industrialisation in Kenya and South Africa. Two main issues, 
policy and competitiveness in areas of trade, investment and employment, were assessed. This 
study therefore approaches the analysis of the economic impact of AGOA in the textiles and 
apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa from a historical, institutional, policy and 
developmental perspective.  
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To achieve its objective, the thesis is organised into five chapters. Chapter 1, the introductory 
chapter, outlines the objectives of the study, the research questions, methodology and the 
organisation of the thesis. Chapter 2 contextualizes the economic conditions in Kenya and South 
Africa which led to the adoption of AGOA. It traces the development of the textiles and apparel 
industry from the 1970s, the period that the textiles and apparel industry experienced significant 
growth, to 2000, the year that AGOA was passed into law to resolve the economic problems 
facing the two countries. The Chapter primarily focuses on the policy environment within which 
the textiles and apparel industry operated and the economic outcome of those polices within this 
period. The essence of this Chapter is to look at the contribution of the textiles and apparel 
industry to poverty reduction and economic activities, such as employment and trade, in Kenya 
and South Africa during the period of ISI, and after the implementation of the first wave of 
economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. This background knowledge will assist greatly in 
understanding the origin, objectives and achievements of AGOA.  
Chapter 3 theoretically and comparatively examines the relationship between liberalism and 
AGOA. It will first look at the underlying principles of liberalism and then comparatively 
examine the underlying principles of liberalism with the underlying principles of AGOA. The 
essence of this Chapter is to establish the development approach which has been used under 
AGOA to promote poverty reduction and economic activities in Kenya and South Africa. 
Chapter 4 is forward looking; it examines the outcome of the interaction between the national 
policies of Kenya and South Africa on one hand and AGOA on the other.  The essence of this 
Chapter is to analyse the economic achievements of AGOA in the textiles and apparel industry 
of Kenya and South Africa. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the entire study. While conclusions 
were drawn from the study, the Chapter touches on possible areas for future research. It also 
provides recommendations for future reforms that can promote poverty reduction and economic 
activities in the textiles and apparel industry.  
Methodology 
To examine the economic impact of AGOA in the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and 
South Africa, the thesis relies on the comparative method of studying several countries. This 
method entails a contextual description of the historical development of the textiles and apparel 
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industry, together with the classification of the two countries into distinct categories with 
identifiable and shared characteristics. The variables which were used to assess the economic 
impact of AGOA are national policies such as tariff reduction and export-led industrialisation, 
adopted by the governments of Kenya and South Africa to facilitate their continuous eligibility 
for AGOA, as well as to promote trade, investment and employment in the two countries. 
External factors such as the provisions on textiles and apparel under AGOA, the termination of 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) and the global financial crisis were also 
considered. The value outcome (statistical figures) of these policies were measured and analysed 
to help assess the economic impact of AGOA.
2
 The value outcome was calculated using the 
annual growth rate of employment and exports. 
The formula: Growth Rate (GR) = X1 – X2 x 100 
X2 
Where X1 represents the value of the current year‟s employment or export, X2 is the value of 
employment or export for the previous year. 
Information for the study was obtained from two major sources – primary and secondary. 
Primary data were obtained from official documents of governments including the governments 
of Kenya, South Africa and the U.S. Aggregate data from international institutions, such as the 
World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) were also used. Secondary sources of 
information included newspaper articles, scholarly journal articles and books, together with 
reports on the textiles and apparel industry published by think tanks such as the Kenya Institute 
for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) and the Trade and Industrial Policy 
Strategies of South Africa (TIPS). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Todd, L. Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction 2
nd
 Ed. New York and London: Taylor and 
Francis Group, 2003, 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE TEXTILES AND APPAREL INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF KENYA, 
AND SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
The textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa, as already mentioned, has been 
integral to the economic development of the two countries, and remains important for economic 
activities, such as employment, trade and investment. This Chapter examines the impact of ISI 
and the first wave of economic reforms in the textiles and apparel industry in the 1980s and 
1990s. What will become evident in the Chapter is that, while ISI was able to promote economic 
activities such as employment in the textiles and apparel industry during the 1970s, the 
implementation of economic reform programmes in the 1980s and 1990s exacerbated economic 
problems facing the textiles and apparel industry of the two countries. ISI refers to the 
establishment of SOEs and para-statals to produce goods and services which would have 
otherwise been imported from foreign countries.  
2.2 Development of the Textiles and Apparel Industry in Kenya (1970-2000) 
After independence in 1963, the government of Kenya, led by Jomo Kenyatta, made 
industrialisation integral to Kenya‟s development strategies. To promote the modernisation, 
industrialisation and transformation of Kenya‟s economic activities from excessive dependence 
on natural resource extraction to secondary economic activities, the government invested heavily 
in SOEs, Corporative Societies (CSs), and Marketing Boards (MBs). The relationship between 
the SOEs, the CSs and the MBs was a „horizontal chain of mutual and interdependent 
relationship.‟ In the agricultural sector, CSs subsidised credits and farming inputs for farmers 
who grew cotton and other crops. After farmers harvested their crops, MBs would buy the farm 
products and sell the products to SOEs. The valued-added products manufactured by SOEs was, 
again, bought by MBs and sold to the domestic and sometimes foreign market. Goods sold by 
MBs were, however, sold below the market price. From this perspective, the key roles of the 
MBs ranged from price control to the protection of marketing margins.  
6 
 
In addition to the roles of the SOEs, the CSs and the MBs, the government further used 
“protection instruments such as duty drawbacks, quantitative restrictions and high tariffs on 
competitive imported goods. The government further overvalued the exchange rate, as well as 
broad-based economic controls that subsidised the industrial sector.”3 Because the textiles and 
apparel industry occupied a prominent position in Kenya‟s economy, the industry was one of the 
manufacturing industries highly protected by the government‟s protection instruments. In 
addition to these protection instruments, the government built irrigation projects in areas such as 
the Nyanza, Western, Coastal, Central, Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces to boost cotton 
production.
4
  
Due to factors ranging from protection instruments, to the efforts of the government to promote a 
backward linkage between the textiles and apparel industry and cotton farming, the textiles and 
apparel industry grew significantly. “It became the leading manufacturing activity in terms of 
size and employment in the 1980s. It has also been mentioned that, from independence to 1990, 
the capacity utilisation of the textiles and apparel industry averaged 70%.”5 The increased 
capacity utilisation of the textiles and apparel industry within this period came with economic 
opportunities such as employment. According to the ILO, from 1971 to 1980, the average rate of 
employment in the textiles and apparel industry was 9.4%.
6
  
What facilitated the growth of the textiles and apparel industry in the 1970s was the four year 
development plan implemented by the Kenyan government in 1966. The Kenyan Development 
Plan (1966-1970) laid the foundation for economic growth in the country by creating and 
defining the roles of SOEs, CSs and MBs. In addition, “the Plan promoted a mixed economy, 
which involves the integration of the agriculture and industry sectors. Public and private 
                                                 
3
 Kinyanjui, M., Ligulu, P. and McCormick, D. “Clothing and Footwear in Kenya: Policy and Research Concerns,” 
in Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialization. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M. (eds). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004, 195 
4
 Ikiara, M.M. and Ndirangu, L.K.  “Prospects for Kenya‟s Clothing Exports Under AGOA After 2004,” in Clothing  
and Footwear in African Industrialization. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M. (eds). Pretoria, South Africa: Africa 
Institute of South Africa, 2004, 237. 
5
 Kenya Investment Authority, Kenya’s Textile and Apparel Industry 2005, 1, www.investmentkenya.com 
(Accessed July 6, 2010). 
6
 LABORSTA – Database of Labour Statistics. An International Labour Office Database on Labour Statistics 
Operated by the International Labour Organization‟s Department of Statistics, http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (Accessed July 
12, 2010). 
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investments were also identified as the ideal means of promoting the mixed economy.”7 Because 
private investment was encouraged under the Plan, the government adopted the Foreign 
Investment Protection Act (FIPA) to protect foreign investors. Under the FIPA, investors were 
required to reinvest profits in Kenya. Foreign investors were, again, required to develop 
managerial training schemes to train Kenyans in such duties so that they, the Kenyans, could 
assume managerial responsibilities.
8
  
In addition to the four year development plan and the FIPA, the government invested in 
institutions such as the Industrial Credit Development Corporation (ICDC) and the Kenya 
Industrial Estate Program (KIEP) to promote the country‟s development agenda. While KIEP 
provided investment allowances, subsidies, and infrastructures to facilitate the country‟s 
industrialisation processes, the ICDC was responsible for developing industrial sheds for African 
entrepreneurs. Again, the ICDC provided loans to industries. In addition to the KIEP and The 
ICDC, the Industrial Development Division (IDD) and Industrial Survey and Promotion Centre 
(ISPC) were also created under the then Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Kenya. While the 
IDD supervised industrial development and planning, the ISPC provided research information on 
investment opportunities, feasibility studies and inter-industry studies. The ISPC further initiated 
studies to identify projects that could be interlinked from the various sectors of the country‟s 
economy.
9
  
However, despite the impressive success of the four year development plan, the FIPA and the 
above mentioned institutions, the long term success was abysmal. Factors ranging from the 
promotion by law, investment and reinvestment of private capital and the onerous responsibility 
of developing managerial schemes to train Kenyans in such duties became a disincentive for 
foreign investment. The imposition of high tariffs on imported goods under the ISI strategy also 
hindered foreign investment because high tariffs imposed on imported raw materials and other 
goods increased the cost of production.  
                                                 
7
 Kinyanjui, M., Ligulu, P. and McCormick, D. “Clothing and Footwear in Kenya: Policy and Research Concerns,” 
in Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialization. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M. (eds). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004, 194 
8
 Ibid., 195-6. 
9
 Ibid., 196-7. 
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The accumulation of these problems contributed to economic problems such as increased 
government budget deficits and rising unemployment in Kenya in the 1980s. The government‟s 
deficit financing arose because, in the 1980s, the government of Kenya had to increase its 
subsidies on oil, due to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil price 
increase. Again, because MBs controlled price margins by fixing producers‟ price for goods 
below the market price, the government could not accrue enough revenue to finance its 
expenditures. Because of the budget deficit incurred in the 1980s, the economic growth rate of 
Kenya decreased from 6% in the first decade of independence to 4% in the 1980s.
10
 Employment 
in the textiles and apparel industry declined sharply. The average rate of employment in the 
textiles and apparel industry decreased more than thrice from 9.4% in the 1970s to 2.7% from 
1981 to 1990.
11
 
Faced with deteriorating economic conditions, the government of Kenya was compelled to seek 
assistance from external sources, such as the IMF/World Bank. However, the IMF/World Bank 
demanded that the Kenyan government implement economic reforms consistent with liberal 
principles before it could access its loans. In response to the IMF/World Bank demands, another 
four year development plan was adopted. The National Development Plan of Kenya (1984-
1988), which departed from the ISI strategy, formed part of the broader Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) of the IMF/World Bank. It began a process of internationalising Kenya‟s 
economy. The Plan resorted to the rhetoric of export-led industrialisation, privatisation, 
divestiture of SOEs, deregulation and trade liberalisation.  
In addition to the National Development Plan (1984-1988), the 1986 Sessional Paper letters, No. 
1 (on Economic Management for Renewed Growth) also categorically stated that the private 
sector should be used as an instrument for resource allocation. The Sessional Paper also 
institutionalised the liberalisation of Kenya‟s financial market and prohibited subsidies and other 
credit facilities given by the Kenyan government to support SOEs, CSs and MBs. To promote 
                                                 
10
 Kinyanjui, M., Ligulu, P. and McCormick, D. “Clothing and Footwear in Kenya: Policy and Research Concerns,” 
in Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialization. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M. (eds). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004, 197. 
11
 LABORSTA – Database of Labour Statistics. An International Labour Office Database on Labour Statistics 
Operated by the International Labour Organization‟s Department of Statistics, http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (Accessed July 
12, 2010). 
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trade and foreign investment, all quantitative restrictions which had been imposed under the ISI 
were removed and custom tariffs were also reduced. Trade promotion schemes, such as the 
Manufacturing Under Bond (MUB), the Green Channel System for Administrative Approval and 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were also adopted.
12
  
The Export Processing Act (EPA) which established the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) was 
adopted to promote export-led industrialisation, foreign exchange earnings, transfer of 
technology and skills, employment, and to enhance Kenya‟s reform efforts. According to Omolo, 
EPZs are a “… designated part of Kenya where goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar 
as import duties are concerned, as being outside the customs territory but are duly restricted by 
controlled access…”13 The EPA gave a 10 year tax holiday, and thereafter, a flat 25% tax for 10 
years to exporters, unrestricted foreign ownership and employment in manufacturing industries, 
together with the freedom to repatriate unlimited amounts of earnings or profits.
14
 The EPA 
further exempted EPZ firms from observing certain core labour laws and regulations. For 
instance, until 2003, trade unions could not organise workers in EPZ firms. EPZ firms were also 
exempted from the value added tax (VAT), stamp duty and from import duties on machinery, 
raw materials and intermediate inputs.
15
 
Although these measures were adopted to ameliorate the deteriorating economic conditions that 
were becoming apparent in the 1980s, the success achieved was marginal. According to the U.S. 
Office of Textiles and Apparel, Kenya‟s export of textiles and apparel to the U.S. increased from 
$7,883,461 in 1992 to $44,048,429 in 2000.
16
 The country‟s economic growth rate also increased 
marginally, i.e., from 1.2% in 1992 to 1.8% in 1993. There was also a decline in value-added 
production from 3.9% in 1995 to 3.7% in 1996.
17
 Comparatively, the average rate of paid 
                                                 
12
 Kinyanjui, M., Ligulu, P. and McCormick, D. “Clothing and Footwear in Kenya: Policy and Research Concerns,” 
in Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialization. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M. (eds). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004, 197. 
13
 Omolo, J.O. “The Textile and Clothing Industry in Kenya,” in The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Jauch, H. and Traub-Merz, R., 149, http://tanzania.fes-international.de/doc/the-future-of-
the-textile-and-clothing-industry-in-sub-saharan-africa.pdf#page=141 (Accessed January 14 2010).   
14
 Ibid., 149.  
15
 Ibid., 149.   
16
 United States Office of Textiles and apparel, http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/ (Accessed August 20, 2010). 
17
 Kinyanjui, M., Ligulu, P. and McCormick, D. “Clothing and Footwear in Kenya: Policy and Research Concerns,” 
in Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialisation. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M. (eds). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004, 197-8. 
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employment in the textile and apparel industry for the first seven years
18
 of the 1990s was 0.8%, 
which was a significant reduction compared to the average rate of employment in the first seven 
years of the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. 9.7% and 4.9% respectively.
19
  
To summarise, this section has shown that, notwithstanding Kenya‟s economic reform efforts in 
the 1980s and 1990s, economic conditions did not show much improvement.  
2.3 Development of the Textiles and Apparel Industry in South Africa (1970-2000) 
In relation to the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya, South Africa‟s textiles and apparel 
industry has a longer history. South Africa‟s textiles and apparel industry dates back to 1889, but 
it was not until 1907 that the first clothing factories at Salt River, Cape Town started operating.
20
 
Since then, the industry has expanded to other geographical areas such as Durban, Pretoria, 
Witwatersrand and Phuthaditjhaba. In addition, production has moved from „special orders‟ like 
uniforms for banks and railway workers, to high quality styled garments, semi-styled garments 
and low quality garments, which cater for high, middle and low income groups.
21
 
Notwithstanding the growth and expansion of the industry in the early years of its establishment, 
events in the South African economy as well as in the international economy from the inter-war 
period to the 1990s made it difficult for the growth and expansion of economic activities in the 
textiles and apparel industry. While the 1970s was characterised by improvements in economic 
activities, events in the 1980s and 1990s inhibited economic activities in the industry.  
From the interwar period to the 1950s, high tariffs imposed on imports in Europe and the U.S. 
brought problems to the business life of South Africans. Tariffs imposed in these countries 
affected South African manufacturers because the business life of South Africa during that 
period was dominated by merchant capital, which drew its strength from the import and export 
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trade.
22
 In addition to this problem, internal problems such as the concentration of the textiles 
and apparel industry in urban areas, to the detriment of the former homelands,
23
 also led to urban 
congestion and its associated problems. 
To resolve these problems, the government of South Africa adopted policies such as (i) import 
substitution industrialisation (ii) mass production (iii) spatial decentralisation of industries and 
(iv) the protection of trade union activities.
24
 “The enactment of these swathes of industrial 
legislations as well as the establishment of active trade unions together ensured that South 
Africa‟s clothing production was based on factories not outwork and that the extremes of 
sweating were prevented from establishing a hold on the trade.”25 
The spatial decentralisation of industries was aimed at reducing urban congestion. The 
government used incentives such as tax exemptions and discounts on electricity to promote the 
relocation of industries to the former homelands, e.g. Harrismith and Butterworth. The spatial 
decentralisation of industries was accompanied with the mass production strategy “which 
changed the production method of industries by permitting a shift to the employment of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. This strategy resulted in a massive change in the racial composition of 
the labour force with the entry in large numbers of black workers.”26 In addition to spatial 
decentralisation and mass production strategies, the government adopted the ISI strategy. ISI led 
to the imposition of high tariff barriers on imported goods. While the high tariffs imposed on 
imported goods led to high cost of imports, ISI facilitated the domestication of South Africa‟s 
manufacturing industries.  
Because of these strategies, economic activities in the textiles and apparel industry increased 
significantly. According to the ILO, employment in the textile and apparel industry increased 
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from 31,000 after WW II,
27
 to 183,293 in 1970.
28
 From 1971 to 1980, employment in the textiles 
and apparel industry averaged 2.4%. Within the same period, the textile and apparel industry 
contributed an average of 16.8% to employment in the manufacturing sector.
29
 
However, despite the success chalked in the 1970s, economic activities in the industry began to 
deteriorate in the 1980s as a result of changes in government policies. In the late 1970s, “the 
textiles and apparel industry, especially those in Witwatersrand, came under assault from the 
apartheid planning legislation, most importantly, the Environmental Planning Act (EPA). Under 
the EPA, industries located in controlled areas (former homelands) were not allowed to expand 
in terms of engaging additional black workers.”30 Again, “in common with the fiction that former 
homelands were not part of South Africa proper, wages in the latter were not regulated at all.”31 
The EPA led to the breaking up of the Witwatersrand clothing cluster and a dominant place for 
the Durban and Cape Town clothing clusters.
32
 Because the clothing cluster in Witwatersrand 
contributed significantly to employment in the 1970s, the breaking up of this cluster led to a 
decline in the rate of employment. From 1981-1990, the average rate of growth in employment 
in the textiles and apparel industry decreased from 2.4% in the 1970s to negative 0.4%.
33
  
Due to the racially discriminatory policies adopted by the apartheid government under the EPA, 
western countries including the U.S., imposed sanctions on South Africa to compel the 
government to abolish its discriminatory policies. In respond to the sanctions, the apartheid 
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government adopted the Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) (1982-91).
34
 “The 
RIDP was aimed at providing the former homelands and other rural areas with an industrial base. 
It offered a substantial 5-year subsidy package to firms locating or relocating anywhere outside 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban.”35 In addition to the RIDP, other labour regulations, such as 
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993 (Act 130 of 1993), the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA), 1995 (Act 66 of 1995), and the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) were also adopted to promote good working conditions for employees, 
since wages and other labour regulation, especially in the former homelands, were not regulated 
during the apartheid period.
36
 
Although this legislation sought to promote the productivity of labour through the promotion of 
good working conditions, it brought a new challenge to manufacturers. For instance, the 1997 
BCEA obliges employers to pay: compulsory maternity leave (four months); 21 consecutive 
days‟ leave with pay of at least equivalent to the remuneration that the employee would have 
received for working for an equivalent period, 10 days‟ sick leave and family responsibility 
leave.
37
 In this respect, the BCEA promoted a high rate of absenteeism, since employees could 
claim compensation for leave under the Act.
38
  
In addition to the high rate of absenteeism, the change in government policy from ISI to export-
led industrialisation in the 1990s exacerbated the problems in the textiles and apparel industry. In 
the 1990s, South Africa began a process of tariff reforms. These policies were aimed at reducing 
the disincentive to export and promoting export-led industrialisation.
39
 Protective tariffs and non-
tariff barriers previously adopted under the ISI strategy were rapidly erased and replaced with 
                                                 
34
 Gibbon, P. “South Africa and the Global Commodity Chain for Clothing: Export Performance and Constraints,” 
in Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialisation. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M.  (eds). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004, 158. 
35
 Gibbon, P. “South Africa and the Global Commodity Chain for Clothing: Export Performance and Constraints,” 
in Clothing and Footwear in African Industrialisation. McCormick, D. and Rogerson, C.M.  (eds). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004, 158. 
36
 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, 5, http://www.bloemfontein.co.za/docs/Basic-Conditions-
of-Employment-Act.pdf (Accessed March 4, 2011).  
37
 Ibid., 13-16. 
38
 Salinger, B.L. et al. Promoting the Competitiveness of Textiles and Clothing Manufacture in South Africa. A 
report submitted to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Africa Office of 
Sustainable Development: Washington, 13, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACH147.pdf (Accessed July 18, 2010). 
39
 Roberts, S. and Thoburn, J. “Adjusting to Trade Liberalisation: The Case of Firms in the South African Textile 
Sector,” Journal of African Economies, 12, No. 1 (2003): 75. 
14 
 
export-promoting incentives, such as the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS). The average 
tariff on fabric, for instance, fell from 50% in 1993 to 24% in 2001. Over the same period, the 
average tariff on yarn fell from 35% to 18%.
40
 In addition to the reduction of tariffs on yarn and 
fabric, quantitative and formula duties were converted to ad valorem tariffs. Other trade-related 
barriers that contravened WTO rules, such as local content requirements were also abolished to 
accomplish South Africa‟s macroeconomic strategy of trade liberalisation.41 These reform 
measures brought a decline in South Africa‟s trade protection barriers to the extent that tariffs on 
many major items were no longer sufficient to prevent imported yarn, fabrics and cloth from 
being sold more cheaply than locally produced yarns, fabrics and cloths, even after payment of 
the import duty.
42
 
Because of the problems associated with the labour regulation laws and the aggressive 
commercial policies pursued by the government of South Africa, manufacturers were compelled 
to restructure the proportion of their output going to the South African market as well as the 
labour component in production.
43
 The restructuring of production and the labour component 
negatively affected employment. Even with the addition of the leather industry to the textiles and 
apparel industry from 1993 onward,
44
 the average rate of employment in the three industries 
could not match the 1970s. The average rate of change in employment in the textiles, apparel and 
leather industry decreased to a record low of negative 0.7% from 1991 to 2000, compared to the 
average rate of change in employment of 2.4% and negative 0.4% in the textiles and apparel 
industry from 1971-1980 and 1981-1990 respectively.
45
 Despite the decrease in the rate of 
employment, it is important to say that the restructuring of output to foreign markets such as the 
U.S. achieved some positive results. According to the U.S. Office of Textiles and Apparel, 
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textiles and apparel imported into the U.S. from South Africa increased from $68,525,278 in 
1995, to $163,371,531 in 2000,
46
 when the country started its export-led industrialisation 
policies.  
To summarise, from 1970 to 2000, the South Africa textiles and apparel industry faced 
significant challenges. This section has shown that, despite the increase in exports to countries 
such as the U.S. in the 1990s, employment in the industry continued to decline because of certain 
policies, e.g. the EPA, labour laws and the aggressive commercial policies pursued by the South 
African government in the 1990s.   
2.4 Conclusion 
Background analysis of the development of the textiles and apparel industry in Kenya and South 
Africa has shown that, although it accounted for a significant proportion of employment in the 
1970s, its growth could not be sustained after the implementation of economic reform policies in 
the 1980s and 1990s. In Kenya, factors such as the promotion by law of private investment and 
reinvestment of profit and the onerous responsibility of developing managerial schemes to train 
Kenyans in such responsibilities, served as disincentives for investment. Again, it was realised 
that factors such as subsidies given to SOEs created under the ISI strategy, the creation of 
institutions like the ICDC, KIEP to provide investment allowances and subsidies, and the 
creation of MBs and CS to subsidise farming inputs, as well as to sell farm products and 
industrial outputs below the market price, led to government budget deficits. Furthermore, it was 
established that, despite the implementation of reform policies to ameliorate the economic 
problems that befell Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s, economic conditions did not show much 
improvement.  
A similar case can be cited for South Africa. An analysis of the textiles and apparel industry of 
South Africa has shown that the apartheid segregation policies, labour regulation laws, and the 
aggressive commercial policies of the South African government stalled the growth of the 
textiles and apparel industry. Labour regulation laws such as the BCEA, which were adopted to 
regulate labour issues as well as to promote good working conditions in areas that had not been 
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regulated under the apartheid rule, served as incentives for absenteeism. In addition to this 
problem, the aggressive commercial policies of the South African government also led to the 
restructuring of production output and the labour component in industrial production. The 
restructuring of production and the labour component in industrial production, together with the 
issue of absenteeism, led to the retrenchment of the number of workers in the textiles and apparel 
industry.   
Chapter 3 examines how AGOA sought to revamp and revitalise economic activities in the 
textiles and apparel industry of the two countries.  
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CHAPTER 3 
U.S. TRADE POLITICS: AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT  
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 has shown that economic conditions in Kenya and South Africa did not show much 
improvement even after the implementation of economic reform policies. Unemployment, 
poverty, a high inflation rate and national debt increased significantly over the years. Kenya and 
South Africa are not the only African countries which experienced such abysmal economic 
outcomes after the implementation of economic reforms. Using the national-accounts-consistent 
poverty estimates, which calculate the proportion of poor people in the population of a country 
using (i) the average annual private consumption per capita, as reported in national accounts 
data, and (ii) the distribution of private consumption amongst households as reported in 
household survey data, UNCTAD‟s Least Developed Countries Report of 2002 estimated that 
between 1995 and 1999, on the list of the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), of which 29 
were in Africa, the extent of poverty was very marked among the 29 African LDCs. It noted that 
87% of the population in the African LDCs lived on less than $2 a day, with an average 
consumption of 86 cents a day, while 65% of the population lived on less than $1 a day with an 
average consumption of 59 cents a day.
47
  
From structural adjustment to economic displacement, the concomitant effects of economic 
reforms in SSA led to an upsurge of socio-political and economic problems, e.g. political 
instability, unemployment, poverty and the apparent internationalisation of the consequences of 
these socio-political and economic problems. Crucial examples of these problems are the 
terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam by Al Qaeda in 1998,
48
 and 
the increasing numbers of refugees and outbreaks of disease such as human immunodeficiency 
virus/ acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). To ameliorate these problems, and to 
ensure the long term benefits of a market economy, the U.S. adopted AGOA. Building on the 
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market access provided by the US-GSP,
49
 AGOA has now become the core U.S. policy for 
promoting trade and investment, stimulating economic growth and promoting poverty reduction, 
as well as facilitating the integration of SSA countries into the international economy.  
While the preceding chapter set the historical context within which the textiles and apparel 
industry operated, and the background to the origin and objectives of AGOA, the objective of 
this chapter is to comparatively examine the relationship between liberalism and the 
development approach used under AGOA to revamp and revitalise economic activities in the 
textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa. What will become evident in this 
chapter is that AGOA seeks to promote poverty reduction and the improvement of economic 
activities in the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa through a market 
economy, or what is commonly referred to as liberalism.   
In this chapter, an overview of the underlying principles of liberalism will be given. It will then 
be followed by a comparative examination of the relationship between liberalism and AGOA, 
and finally, an examination of the provisions on textiles and apparel trade under AGOA. This 
will serve as background knowledge for assessing the impact of AGOA in Kenya and South 
Africa. 
3.2 The Governing Principles of Liberalism 
In this section, a summary of the governing principles and competing ideas of liberalism will be 
given to provide a background to a comparative examination of the relationship between 
liberalism and AGOA. The liberal principles promoted by Western countries, including the U.S., 
and international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the WTO, rests on four main 
principles, i.e., the free market economy (free trade and trade agreements), private property 
ownership, limited government involvement in economic activities and the promotion of freely 
convertible currencies. Liberals believe that a free market economy promotes tariff reduction, 
which in turn promotes production and efficient capacity utilisation of resources. According to 
Polanyi “liberalism is utterly materialistic and believes that all human problems can be resolved 
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when the individual is given an unlimited amount of material commodities.”50 Liberals such as 
Adam Smith (1723-1790), David Ricardo (1772-1823), Milton Friedman (1912-2006) and Karl 
Polanyi (1886-1964) have argued that, “in a free market economy, the consumer or the 
individual is protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other sellers with 
whom he or she can deal, vis-a-vis, the seller and the employee.”51 According to Friedman “the 
market does this impersonally without central authority.”52   
Notwithstanding these underlying principles, there exist variations among liberals on the role of 
government in a free or liberalised state. Orthodox liberals, or what is commonly referred to as 
neoliberals,
53
 such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Milton Friedman, argue that the market 
should be allowed to function with minimal or no government interference. According to 
Friedman, “to benefit from the promise of government while avoiding the threat to freedom, the 
scope of government must be limited to the determination of the „rules of the game‟ and to 
providing means where individuals can modify, mediate, interpret and enforce compliance with 
rules.”54 He posits that “the scope of government must be limited. Its major function must be to 
protect our freedom both from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens; to 
maintain law and order; to enforce private contracts and to foster competitive markets.”55 He 
further argues that “the power of governments must be dispersed.”56 Thus, Friedman and his 
contemporaries do not only support limited government intervention in the market, but also 
believe that, in order to enhance individual freedom, the government power must be 
decentralised.  
Despite these beliefs, Interventionist liberals
57
 (hereafter interventionist), such as Karl Polanyi 
and John Maynard Keynes take a different position on the role of government in a liberal state. 
Interventionists argue that, to protect the individual against market imperfection, some form of 
government support, e.g. fiscal policies, investment and (to a lesser extent) monetary policies in 
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the market are necessary to promote equality, justice and employment.
58
 According to Polanyi, 
“the idea of a self-adjusting market implies a stark utopia.”59 He posits that “such an institution 
could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of 
society. Such an institution, he suggests, would physically destroy man and transform his 
surroundings into a wilderness.
60
 Despite painting such a gloomy picture about the self-adjusting, 
or free market, Polanyi forcefully argues that “we must not abandon the principle of individual 
freedom but re-create it.”61 Consequently, interventionist liberals like Polanyi favour government 
intervention – not to replace capitalism, but to rescue and revitalise it.62 
Two competing liberal ideas have influenced national and commercial policies in the 
international economy since the 19th century. Influenced by interventionist ideas, postwar 
planners in the 1950s and 1960s designed economic policies on the basis of interventionism. 
This brought a movement toward greater openness in the international economy, but 
governments also adopted contingency measures to promote economic stability and to cushion 
domestic economic activities. For instance, countries such as the U.S. called for multilateral 
tariff reduction but were permitted to use safeguards and exemptions from trade regulations set 
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to promote their balance of payment, 
full employment and economic growth.
63
 Notwithstanding these, however, international 
pressures, for instance the 1960s U.S. balance of payment deficit, 1970s OPEC oil price 
increases and the prolonged global recession following 1974, made it costly for governments to 
continue with welfare and full employment policies. Orthodox or neo-liberalism took turns to 
influence policies of governments in Western countries and international institutions like the 
World Bank. Neoliberals argue that a, “radical alternative to neoliberalism was not possible”, 
and that, in line with British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher's, memorable phrase: TINA 
("There is no alternative.")
64
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A summary of the underlying and competing principles of liberalism has shown that, the logic of 
liberalism is the promotion of a market economy and individual freedom. Liberals take a bottom-
up approach to development by stressing the primacy of the individual consumer, firms or the 
entrepreneur. Liberals also seek to transform development from the state-centric approach to 
private property ownership. Despite the primacy of the individual in liberalism, there is a 
consensus among liberals that government intervention, especially in maintaining law and order, 
is important. 
The next section compares two competing ideas under liberalism that have been integrated into 
AGOA.  
3.3 The Governing Principles of the African Growth and Opportunity Act: Liberalism 
In this section, what will become evident is that the AGOA‟s development approach is rooted in 
the market economy, or what is commonly referred to as liberalism. Passed into law on May 18, 
2000, AGOA authorises the U.S. President to designate a SSA country as eligible for duty-free 
and quota-free trade if the U.S. President determines that the country has established, or is 
making progress toward establishing, the following: a market-based economy; the rule of law 
and political pluralism; the elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; the protection of 
intellectual property rights; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing 
availability of health care and educational opportunities; the protection of human rights and 
workers‟ rights; and the elimination of certain child labour practices.65 
Essentially, AGOA‟s eligibility criteria approach the development of SSA from three main 
liberal perspectives. The first liberal principle of AGOA is the promotion of a market economy. 
AGOA, essentially, is a non-reciprocal trade agreement between eligible SSA countries and the 
U.S. It gives incentives through preferential treatment on tariffs to SSA countries that have made 
progress or are making progress toward reducing tariff barriers imposed on trade and investment. 
It also promotes individual‟s rights, such as human rights, the protection of intellectual property 
rights, and other internationally recognised workers rights. The protection of human rights and 
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other internationally recognised workers rights involves the national treatment of foreign 
workers as well as foreigners. The protection of intellectual property rights also involves the 
prevention of illegal reduplication or reproduction of industrial properties like inventions and 
literal and artistic works without due recognition of the inventor or author. The objective of these 
principles is to give substance to private property ownership.  
The second market principle of AGOA is the mandate given to the U.S President to move 
forward to negotiate free trade agreements, where feasible, with interested SSA countries. In 
June 2003, an effort was made by the U.S. to negotiate a free trade agreement with the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) but was suspended indefinitely in 2006 because the U.S. 
Administration and the SACU Officials could not agree on the scale and scope of the 
negotiation.
66
 Despite the suspension of the negotiation with the SACU, the U.S has negotiated 
several trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs) with SSA countries, for example, 
South Africa. Generally, the TIFAs commit signatories to expand trade of goods and services, to 
encourage private sector investment, and to resolve trade problems and disputes through 
consultation and dialogue.
67
 
The final market principle of AGOA is the mandate given to the U.S. president under the Act, to 
organise a U.S.-SSA trade and economic cooperation forum hosted by the Secretary of State, 
Commerce, Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative. The Forum is to serve as a vehicle for 
regular dialogue between the U.S. and African countries on issues of economics, trade, and 
investment interests.
68
 By 2008, seven AGOA Forums had been organised. The seventh AGOA 
Forum was held in Washington DC from July 14 to16, 2008. It focused on creating a business 
climate that would encourage private investment and help mobilise capital to finance investment 
in SSA.
69
 The Act further called on the U.S. President to promote trade and investment in 
                                                 
66
 Langton, D. U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African Growth and 
Opportunity Act and Beyond, 22, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31772.pdf (Accessed December 10, 2009).  
67
 Ibid., 23. 
68
 The African Growth and Opportunity Act, http://www.agoa.gov (Accessed December 16, 2010)  
69
 Ibid. 
23 
 
eligible SSA countries through the creation of a privately managed equity fund; aimed at 
encouraging U.S. private investors to invest in African businesses and infrastructure projects.
70
  
The second liberal principle of AGOA is the promotion of limited government and political 
pluralism. Under this approach, the U.S President is authorised by the Act to terminate the 
eligibility of a country for AGOA‟s preferential treatment if the President in consultation with 
the AGOA Implementation Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) and 
other U.S. state institutions, e.g. the U.S. Department of Commerce, determine that such a 
country is not making progress in meeting the eligibility criteria.
71
 One of the main criteria that 
can influence the President‟s decision is the progress a country is making toward addressing the 
problem of bribery and corruption. This is mainly due to the extra cost that bribery and 
corruption add to production. Again, these two problems serve as disincentives for investment 
and trade. In order to promote a friendly environment for private investment and the free flow of 
goods and services, the AGOA legislation charges eligible SSA countries to promote the rule of 
law and institutional mechanisms that will help combat bribery and corruption. Another area of 
interest is the promotion of political pluralism.  In December 2003, the Central African Republic 
(CAR) was removed from amongst AGOA eligible countries because of a military coup. The 
Côte d‟Ivoire was also removed in 2004 for failing to implement political and economic reforms 
that would promote individual freedom and democratic governance.
72
 The rule of law and 
political pluralism under AGOA serves as a bedrock for promoting limited and representative 
government in SSA.  
The final liberal principle of AGOA is the creation of institutions like the Assistant United States 
Trade Representative for African Affairs (hereafter African Office or Office). The African Office 
was created to develop and coordinate U.S. trade and investment policies with eligible SSA 
countries. The Office leads interagency negotiation and implements a number of U.S. trade and 
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investment policies in SSA. The Office also serves as an instrument to open SSA markets to U.S. 
goods, services and investment, while at the same time helping SSA countries to use trade as a 
means of advancing their economic growth. The Office further oversees the implementation of 
AGOA, and works closely with other U.S. agencies, e.g. the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), to help eligible countries make the most of AGOA's trade 
benefits.
73
 In addition to the African Office, the Act encourages TIFA signatories to establish a 
Council on Trade and Investment to provide a venue for consultation on trade issues of interest 
or concern to the parties, and to work toward the removal of impediments to trade and 
investment flows.
 74
 
To summarise, it has been established in this section that AGOA‟s development approach is 
rooted in three main liberal principles: a market economy, limited or democratic governance and 
the establishment of institutions to manage trade and investment policies. AGOA therefore 
approaches the development of SSA countries from both neoliberal and interventionist 
perspectives. The proceeding section examines the provisions for textiles and apparel under 
AGOA to provide background knowledge for the assessment of the impact of AGOA in the 
textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa.  
3.4 Textiles and Apparel Provisions under AGOA 
Another area of interest in the development approach of AGOA is the provisions on textiles and 
apparel. The objectives of the provisions are two folds. The first objective is to promote trade, 
investment and industrialisation in eligible SSA countries. Finally, the provisions serve as 
preconditions for the application of preferential treatment as well as to help prevent the use of 
counterfeit documents or the transhipment of textiles and apparel exported from a third-country 
to the U.S. through an AGOA eligible country. 
As already mentioned, AGOA provides duty-free and quota-free treatment for eligible apparel 
articles made in qualifying SSA countries for the U.S. through to 2015. Preferential treatment for 
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apparel took effect on October 1, 2000, but to benefit from such treatment, a SSA country is 
required to have established effective visa systems to prevent illegal transhipment and the use of 
counterfeit documentation. Again, a SSA country is required to have instituted required 
enforcement and verification procedures so that the U.S. Customs Service Verification Team can 
verify the origin of textiles and apparel imported into the U.S under AGOA.
75
   
Before 2008, the provisions on textiles and apparel were amended thrice, i.e., 2002, 2004 and 
2006, showing the sensitive nature of textiles and apparel trade under AGOA. In 2002, Congress 
passed legislation which extended AGOA‟s benefits beyond the original deadline –from 2004 to 
2015. The 2002 amendment also clarified the provision on knit-to-shape or “wholly assembled” 
apparel articles. It allowed knit-to-shape articles to qualify for preferential treatment when the 
yarn and fabric that have been knit-to-shape is imported from the U.S. or from a beneficiary SSA 
country. The 2002 amendment also increased the cap for apparel made in eligible countries from 
regional fabric or yarn from 3% to 7% over eight years.
76
  
In 2004, President Bush signed the AGOA Acceleration Act. The AGOA Acceleration Act is the 
most extensive amendment of the provisions on textiles and apparel since AGOA was passed 
into law. It:  
(i) extended third-country fabric provision for three years, from September 2004 until 
September 2007. The cap imposed on third-country fabric in 2002 was then rescheduled 
to be increased in years 1 and 2 and then to be scaled back in 2007, the 3
rd
 year; 
(ii) expanded duty-free treatment for handmade, hand-loomed, and folklore articles to   
certain machine-made ethnic printed fabric made in SSA;
 77
 
(iii)  expanded eligibility to include garments made with third-country collars and cuffs (cut 
or knit-to-shape), drawstrings, padding/shoulder pads, waistbands, belts (attached to the 
garment), straps with elastic, and elbow patches; 
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(iv) increased the AGOA de minimis amount from 7% to 10%. The AGOA de minimis rule 
states that, apparel assembled in SSA with the presence of particular fibres or yarns not 
wholly formed in the U.S. or a beneficiary SSA country will still be eligible for 
preferential benefits as long as the total weight of the imported fibre or yarn is not more 
than 10% of the total weight of the article;  
(v) modified the rules of origin governing textiles and apparel trade, to allow certain textiles 
and apparel articles assembled either in the U.S. or an eligible SSA country to qualify for 
preferential treatment.
78
 
The rules applied to determining the origin of goods employ two different criteria. The criterion 
of goods “wholly produced or obtained” in a given country, where one country enters into 
consideration in attributing origin, and the criterion of “substantial transformation,” where two or 
more countries have taken part in producing the good.
 79
 The „wholly produced‟ criterion applies 
mainly to “natural” products and goods entirely made from them, so that goods containing any 
imported part or materials, or the same of undetermined origin, are generally excluded from its 
field of application.
80
 Under AGOA, textiles and apparel manufactured from locally produced 
fabric and yarn qualify for preferential treatment since the fabric and yarn used to manufacture 
the textile and apparel is locally produced.  
The provisions on textiles and apparel, however, become complicated under the AGOA 
„substantial transformation‟ criterion. Under this criterion there is a cap imposed on textiles and 
apparel manufactured from third-country fabric. The term „third-country‟ refers to any country in 
the world with the exception of the U.S. and eligible SSA countries. The cap imposed on apparel 
made from third country fabric applies only to AGOA lesser-developed beneficiary developing 
countries (LDBDCs). LDBDCs are SSA countries which had a per capita GNP of less than 
$1,500 a year in 1998, as measured by the World Bank.
81
 Under AGOA‟s special rule for 
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LDBDCs, LDBDCs obtain preferential treatment (qualifying for duty- and quota-free treatment) 
for apparel assembled in beneficiary countries, regardless of the origin of the fabric and yarn 
from 2001 until September 30, 2012 as amended in 2006.
82
 The apparel imported into the U.S 
under the special rule for LDBDCs is limited to an amount not to exceed a cap of 2.6% or 535.9 
square metres equivalent in the year. These quantities are recalculated for each subsequent year, 
as stated in the 2004 amendment. Apparel articles entering in excess of these quantities are, 
however, subjected to applicable tariffs.
 83
 
Another provision under the „substantial transformation‟ criterion is the provision governing 
both AGOA beneficiary countries (BCs) and LDBDCs. BCs are SSA countries which had a per 
capita GNP  of more than $1,500 a year in 1998, as measured by the World Bank. BCs do not 
benefit from the apparel special rule as they are limited to fabric and yarn which are either 
locally produced or imported from the U.S. or eligible SSA countries. Though the fabric and 
yarn imported from the U.S. or eligible SSA country qualify for preferential treatment, the 
textiles and apparel manufactured from it is subject to certain conditions which include: (i) a cap 
on apparel made of SSA yarns and fabrics. The cap includes the extension of preferential 
treatment on a yearly basis and in each of these years, imports of apparel items from the country 
that uses regional/SSA fabric and yarn should not exceed the applicable percentage (10% over an 
8 year period) of the aggregate square metre equivalent of all articles imported into the U.S. 
during the preceding 12 months, (ii) that the apparel consists of certain cashmere and merino 
wool sweaters, (iii) that the textiles and apparel are made of eligible hand-loomed, handmade, 
folklore articles or ethnic printed fabric and, according to a determination by the U.S. President, 
that yarns or fabrics needed for producing apparel are not available in commercial quantities or 
cannot be supplied on a timely manner in the U.S.
84
 
Textile articles are also eligible for AGOA‟s preferential treatment if they contain findings or 
trimming (sewing thread, hooks and eyes, buttons and zippers) the value of which does not 
exceed 25% of the cost of the components of the assembled article. The AGOA de minimis rule 
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further states that, an article is eligible for preferential treatment if the total weight of fabric or 
yarn, not wholly formed in the U.S. or beneficial SSA country, does not exceed 10% of the total 
weight of the article.
85
  
To ensure compliance with these provisions, Congress has directed the U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce to monitor the quantity of textiles and apparel imported into the U.S. to determine if 
there is a surge of imports. According to the text of AGOA, “if the Secretary determines (through 
report by interested parties and forensic studies) that the surge of these articles is more likely to 
cause serious economic damage, or threat thereof to domestic industries producing similar or 
directly competitive articles, the U.S. President shall suspend the duty-free treatment provided 
for the article.”86 To promote transparency in the President‟s decision, the Act requires the 
Secretary of Commerce to depend on indicators like domestic production, sales, market share, 
capacity utilisation, inventories, employment, profits, exports, prices, and investment to assess 
the impact of these articles.
87
  
A rough work on the effects of trade liberalisation, preferential treatment and the rules of origin 
governing textiles and apparel trade in Kenya and South Africa have yielded mixed results. In an 
interview of some selected firms and stakeholders in the textiles and clothing industry of South 
Africa, Roberts and Thoburn found that, because of trade liberalisation, a significant proportion 
of exporting firms in South Africa were doing so for defensive reasons because of threats to the 
domestic market.”88 With regard to employment and the growth of the textiles and apparel 
industry to other geographical areas, Robert and Thoburn argue that trade liberalisation has led to 
the concentration of textiles and clothing firms in three provinces, namely the Western Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, while towns such as Mooi River, Harrismith and Butterworth, 
which were formerly hubs of textiles and clothing activities, have become industrial ghost 
towns.
89
 They also found that the upgrading of industrial machinery in the mid-1990s, together 
with the restructuring of production and the labour component in production led to labour 
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displacement. They argue that “the new generation of machines purchased by firms in recent 
years have much greater throughput than those they replace. A new loom or dyeing machine, 
according to them, may increase production by 50 to 100% over the machines they replaced. 
This means higher labour productivity and lower unit labour costs, along with reductions in 
employment.”90 
On the issue of rules of origin governing the textiles and apparel trade, Ikiara and Ndirangu 
argue that, despite the critique against AGOA, it is a good intervention for Kenya because it 
provides an opportunity to build capacity in the textiles and apparel industry.
91
 However, they 
caution that the opportunity for capacity building in Kenya is slipping away because of the 
termination of the LDBDCs special rule in September 2004. According to Ikaria and Ndirangu, 
the termination of the special rule will pose three major challenges to Kenya‟s textiles and 
apparel industry. The first challenge they identified was the sourcing of yarn and fabric for 
production. They argue that sourcing yarn and fabric from the U.S. to make apparel will at least 
double the unit cost of production in Kenya, thus rendering uncompetitive the manufactured 
apparel. The second challenge they identified concerned cotton production in Kenya. They argue 
that cotton production in Kenya is insufficient and of low quality due to infrastructure, market 
and policy constraints. Finally, they suggest that the option of sourcing fabric and yarn from 
AGOA eligible countries is also limited, due to supply constraints similar to those at work in 
Kenya. Because of these problems, they suggest that Kenya improves its cotton farming, since 
Kenya has a comparative advantage in cotton production.
92
 
According to Thompson, the rules of origin which eligible countries are supposed to implement, 
allow the door of trade to be slammed shut by the U.S. at any time, making it impossible for 
enterprises to plan long term production strategies.
93
 She suggests that, although AGOA claim to 
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promote economic growth in SSA through trade liberalisation and foreign investment, the United 
Nations (U.N) World Investment Report of 2003 states that foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
SSA from all sources amounted to $8.1 billion in 2003, which represented a 41% decrease from 
the year 2000. U.S. imports and investment in SSA, in her opinion, has been concentrated in oil- 
rich countries, such as Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. She posits “82 
percent of AGOA‟s imports have been in the area of minerals and oil. Textiles, the only sector 
that exports processed goods, accounts for only 5 percent of U.S. imports from SSA.”94 She 
further argues that the imposition of national treatment for foreign investors is also inhibiting the 
development of African industries. Governments in SSA, according to her, cannot give special 
interest rates on loans to local small and medium-sized businesses while global corporations can 
borrow money anywhere in the world, finding the lowest interest rates, and offshore their profits 
to the Cayman Islands, or other tax havens, to avoid paying tax.
95
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that AGOA‟s development approach is rooted in liberalism. AGOA 
seeks to promote poverty reduction in SSA through a market economy, private property 
ownership, national treatment of foreign investors, protection of intellectual property and a 
commitment to the fight against bribery and corruption. To reinforce its commitment to these 
liberal principles, the U.S. government has created institutions like the African Office, to lead 
interagency negotiation and the implementation of a number of U.S. trade and investment 
policies in SSA. The Office further oversees the implementation of AGOA, and also works 
closely with other U.S. institutions, e.g. USAID to ensure conformity with policy formulation, 
implementation and evaluation in SSA. 
Finally, to promote its commitment to a market economy, the Act mandates governments in the 
U.S. and eligible SSA countries to meet annually in the form of a forum which serves as a 
platform for settling trade disputes and to foster political and economic ties. Because the textiles 
and apparel industry is one of the manufacturing industries that is strategically targeted for 
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promoting poverty reduction, the U.S. has given preferential treatment to textiles and apparel 
manufactured in eligible SSA countries. The next chapter will critically assess the impact of 
AGOA in the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 4 
LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF REFORM POLICIES IN 
KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA’S TEXTILES AND APPAREL INDUSTRY 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I will argue that AGOA has had a mixed impact on the textiles and apparel 
industry of Kenya and South Africa. While AGOA has contributed to the exacerbation of 
problems facing the textiles and apparel industry in South Africa, it has helped improve and 
safeguard economic activities in Kenya‟s textiles and apparel industry. The Chapter proceeds by 
assessing the relationship between external factors, such as preferential treatment, the ATC, the 
global financial crisis and the promotion of employment, trade and investment in the textiles and 
apparel industry of South Africa and Kenya. Internal factors, such as commercial policies, 
monetary policies, policy management (policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation), political instability, and the development of human, capital and physical resources to 
promote poverty reduction are also assessed. The Chapter generally focuses on developments 
that took place in the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa from 2000, the 
year AGOA was passed into law, to 2008, the initial year that preferential treatment for textiles 
and apparel was scheduled to expire. 
Given these objectives, the Chapter is divided into three parts. Section One presents an overview 
of the impact of AGOA in eligible SSA countries. It looks at the dynamics of trade between 
eligible SSA countries and the U.S. from the day AGOA was passed into law up to 2008. 
Sections Two and Three analyse developments in the textiles and apparel industry in Kenya and 
South Africa under AGOA from 2000 to 2008. It looks at trade (exports) to the U.S., sources of 
competition for the textiles and apparel industry in the two countries, as well as investment and 
the rate of employment in this same context. At its core, this section will look at how the internal 
and external factors mentioned above have interacted to produce the conditions facing the 
industry.  
  
33 
 
4.2 Overview of the Impact of AGOA in Eligible SSA Countries. 
As already mentioned, AGOA is the sole U.S. policy which seeks to promote poverty reduction 
through trade and investment in SSA. It also seeks to prevent the internationalisation of crime, 
especially those emanating from SSA as a result of economic and political displacement. In 
October 2000, Kenya and South Africa were among the first 34 of the 48 SSA countries to be 
designated eligible for AGOA‟s trade and investment benefits.96 The number of beneficiary 
countries was however increased to 40 in 2008.
97
 Being eligible for AGOA does not 
automatically give the country textiles and apparel trade benefits. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
eligibility for such benefits is determined when the U.S. President, in consultation with the U.S. 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and other U.S. institutions, decide that the SSA 
countries have established effective visa systems and have instituted required enforcement and 
verification procedures to check against transhipment of textiles and apparel.  
Despite the positive objectives of the textiles and apparel provisions, its complexity has dwarfed 
the intended objectives of the Act. It has also limited the number of countries which benefit from 
the textiles and apparel provisions. “In 2008, only three countries were added to the list of 24 
eligible countries which benefited from the textiles and apparel provisions in 2005. Even among 
the 27 countries in 2008, only 18 countries, including Kenya and South Africa, qualified for 
hand-loomed and handmade articles.”98 Table 1 shows the catalogue of textiles and apparel 
benefits of Kenya and South Africa.  
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Table 1: AGOA Preferences: Apparel and Textiles Eligibility of Kenya and South Africa. 
 
 
 
Date 
Declared 
AGOA 
Eligible 
Date 
Declared 
Eligible for 
Apparel 
Provision 
LDBDC 
Special Rule 
For Apparel 
(3rd Country 
Fabric) 
LDBDC 
Rule  for 
Certain 
Textile 
Articles 
 
 
Hand-
loomed/ 
Handmade 
 
 
 
Folklore 
Annex 
 
 
Ethnic 
Printed 
Fabrics 
 
Kenya 
 
Oct. 2, 2000 
January 18, 
2001 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
South 
Africa 
 
Oct. 2, 2000 
March 7, 
2001 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Source: U.S Office of Textiles and Apparel.
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Table 1 show that Kenya and South Africa benefit from different categories of preferential 
treatments under the textiles and apparel provisions of AGOA. Kenya is eligible for AGOA‟s 
LDBDCs special rule. South Africa, on the other hand, does not qualify for the LDBDC special 
rule because its per capita GNP was more than $1,500 in 1998. This has limited South Africa to 
only locally produced yarn and fabric or imported yarn and fabric from an eligible SSA country 
or the U.S. 
The short duration of the LDBDCs special rule, the textiles and apparel provisions and the 
complicated and constantly changing provisions governing textiles and apparel trade under 
AGOA have contributed to the decline in investment in the industry and the apparent domination 
of the raw materials in AGOA‟s trade. For instance, AGOA (including GSP) imports increased 
to $51.1 billion in 2007, up 16% from 2006 ($44.2 billion). However, petroleum and energy 
related products accounted for 93% of the overall AGOA imports in 2007. With the exception of 
South Africa – which is among the top five highest AGOA related export countries and remains 
the most diversified in its exports – petroleum exports remain the main export for four of the top 
five AGOA exporters. The top 5 AGOA related export countries are Nigeria, Angola, Chad, 
Gabon and South Africa.
100
  
Although there was an increase in non-oil exports from $1.4 billion in 2001 to $3.4 billion in 
2007, it constituted only 7% of total AGOA exports from SSA. “Textiles and apparel exports 
which is a non-oil export, increased from $359.4 million in 2001 to $1.3 billion in 2007. It 
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accounted for 40% of AGOA non-oil imports in 2007.”101 According to the 2008 AGOA Report, 
among the list of 21 countries which exported textiles and apparel to the U.S. in 2008, only five 
countries (Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya, Swaziland and Mauritius) dominated exports of these 
products to the U.S.
102
 These five countries, together with South Africa, have been the top 6 
countries accounting for most textiles and apparel exports under AGOA since 2001 (see Table 
2). 
In 2004, among the countries eligible for AGOA‟s textiles and apparel benefits, the top 6 textiles and 
apparel exporting countries exported 91.3% of the total $1,782,649,940 AGOA textile and apparel 
exports. Although the amount of textiles and apparel exported to the U.S. decreased to 
$1,177,063,772 in 2008 and in the same year, countries such as Cameroon and Ethiopia increased 
their textiles and apparel exports, the 6 countries were still the highest AGOA textiles and apparel 
exporters, with a share of 96.3%. 
Table 2: Share of AGOA Textiles and Apparel Trade in the Top Six Sub-Saharan African 
Countries in 2004 and 2008.  
 
Country 
 
Export 2004 (Dollars) 
Percentage Share by 
Volume (2004) 
 
Export 2008 (Dollars) 
Percentage Share by 
volume (2008) 
 
Lesotho 
 
455,753,191 
 
25.6 
 
339,690,343 
 
28.9 
 
Kenya 
 
277,326,532 
 
15.6 
 
246,906,070 
 
21.0 
 
Madagascar 
 
323,133,066 
 
18.1 
 
279,207,100 
 
23.7 
 
Swaziland 
 
178,712,284 
 
10.0 
 
124,901,316 
 
10.6 
 
South Africa 
 
163,881,488 
 
9.2 
 
40,893,687 
 
3.5 
 
Mauritius 
 
227,479,506 
 
12.8 
 
101,553,117 
 
8.6 
 
Sub Total 
 
1,626,286,067 
 
91.3 
 
1,133,151,633 
 
96.3 
 
Total SSA 
 
1,782,649,940 
  
1,177,063,722 
 
Source: U.S. Office of Textiles and Apparel.
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To summarise, this section has shown that, among the 40 SSA countries eligible for AGOA‟s 
preferential treatment in 2008, only ten countries have been dominating trade in oil and non-oil 
products. 
4.3 AGOA and the Textiles and Apparel Industry in South Africa 
As mentioned earlier, South Africa has been implementing commercial policies since the 1990s 
However, even in 2006, the outcome of such policies was still marginal. According to the South 
African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the economic growth of South Africa increased 
from 4.8% in 2004 to 5.09% in 2005 but fell to 5.0% in 2006.
104
 It is therefore important to 
understand why the country‟s economic growth has been less than spectacular, despite the 
aggressive commercial policies and South Africa‟s eligibility for AGOA. 
Since 1994, the South African economy has been dominated by three sub-sectors, i.e. the 
minerals, metals and energy industries. In its quest to transform the country‟s economy from 
overreliance on natural resources to the promotion of secondary and tertiary economic activities, 
the South African government turned to talks of a „developmental state‟ in the 2000s.105 The idea 
of a „developmental state,‟ which coincided with AGOA, was aimed at promoting employment 
and poverty reduction through export-led industrialisation. To achieve these objectives, the 
government of South Africa adopted the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (ASGI-SA) and later the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF). These plans 
sought to promote the development of South Africa through: 
1. Facilitating the diversification of South Africa‟s economy beyond the country‟s reliance on 
traditional commodities to the promotion of increased value adding activities, which are mainly 
characterised by a movement into non-traditional, tradeable goods and services that compete in 
export markets as well as against imports; 
2. Ensuring the long-term intensification of South Africa‟s industrialisation process and movement 
towards a knowledge-based economy; 
                                                 
104
 The South African Department of Trade and Industries, Annual Reports 2007/08. National Industrial 
Framework, 15, http://www.dti.gov.za/publications/publications.htm (Accessed September 25, 2010). 
105
 Takala, L. „The Role of Industrial Policy and the Minerals-Energy Complex in the Decline of South African 
Textiles and Clothing’, 24, http://www.tips.org.za (Accessed September 20, 2010). 
37 
 
3. Promoting more labour-absorbing industrial activities, with a particular emphasis on tradable 
labour, which absorbs goods and services and economic linkages that catalyze employment 
creation; 
4. Promoting a broader-based industrialisation path characterised by increased participation of 
historically disadvantaged people and marginalised regions in the mainstream of the industrial 
economy and, 
5. Contributing to the industrial development of Africa, with a strong emphasis on building 
productive capacities.
106
 
Essentially, these measures form part of the core AGOA development approach. The ASGI-SA 
and NIPF were in this respect, adopted to promote poverty reduction through measures such as 
economic upgrading, expanding the market economy and a movement from almost exclusive 
dependence on primary economic activities toward a secondary and knowledge-based economy 
favourable for investment and employment creation. The Plans also served as blue prints for the 
integration and contribution of South Africa‟s industrial capacity to the industrial development of 
Africa.  
With regard to economic upgrading and the transformation of South Africa‟s economy into an 
industrial and knowledge-based economy, the government adopted intervention measures aimed 
at (i) supporting investment to update ageing industrial machinery and manufacturing equipment 
stocks; (ii) deepening manufacturing capabilities; (iii) supporting industries and economic 
cluster-specific infrastructure, and (iv) addressing monopoly pricing in the country.
107
 Other 
macroeconomic measures, such as currency stabilisation, inflation control and tariff reduction 
were also undertaken to facilitate the „developmental state‟ agenda and South Africa‟s 
continuous eligibility for AGOA.  
Using the HS8 most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff schedule for July 2000 and March 2001, 
combined with HS8 level import data for 2000, Cassim et al noted that “tariff reduction was 
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achieved across all sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, mining and gas) during the period. In the 
manufacturing sector, they mentioned that the un-weighted average tariff dropped from 16% to 
7%.”108 With regard to the textiles and apparel industry, it has been mentioned by Roberts and 
Thoburn that, from 1993 to 2002, tariffs on yarn, fabrics and made-up household textiles fell 
significantly. According to them, tariffs on yarn “fell from 35% to 15%, on fabrics from 50% to 
22%, and those on made-up household textiles from 60% to 30%. They further mentioned that 
the average tariffs on clothing fell from 100% to 40%.”109 This means that within this nine-year 
period, tariffs in the textiles and apparel industry alone were reduced by more than half. These 
commercial policies were engineered to promote South Africa‟s entry into the WTO, investment, 
as well as, cheap imports of yarn and fabric and exports of textiles and apparel to the U.S. 
because South Africa was eligible for AGOA‟s textiles and apparel preferential treatment. With 
such reductions, manufacturers could import yarn and fabric at a reduced cost, which in turn 
would increase production and trade with the U.S. and other countries. 
The government of South Africa also adopted incentive measures like the Duty Credit Certificate 
Scheme (DCCS) and the Interim Clothing and Textiles Scheme (ICTS). Launched in 1993, the 
DCCS provided two way incentives which included customs duty rebates on imported inputs
110
 
and “export incentives for manufacturers up to March 31, 2005. The ICTS was launched later as 
an interim measure to run until September 30, 2006,”111 to solve the problems mentioned above 
as well as to facilitate negotiations between the government of South Africa, labour 
organisations, such as the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU), and 
textiles and apparel manufacturers in South Africa on a Customised Sector Plan (CSP).  
However, it was not until the adoption of a CSP that the government‟s incentive package 
attracted internal and external challenges. Externally, the Schemes were regarded as non-
compliant with WTO rules, according to which all government subsidies were being 
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disallowed.
112
 Internally, uncompetitive manufacturers used the Scheme as a revenue generator 
by selling their certificates to retailers, who in turn used the certificate to receive 30% to 40% 
discount on imported apparel duties, thus reducing demand for domestically produced apparel 
and ultimately hurting domestically oriented clothing firms.
113
 In spite of these challenges, a CSP 
was agreed upon by the stakeholders in the textiles and apparel industry in mid-2005.
114
 In the 
CSP the stakeholders agreed: 
1. To ask the government to engage in multilateral forums to ensure that South Africa could 
respond to the dumping (undervaluing or not declared) of illegal clothing and textiles; 
2. To ask the government to improve the capacity and personnel at Customs Offices to help 
eliminate under-invoicing and illegal imports;
115
 
3. To establish a partnership agreement between South Africa and SACU, in order to ensure 
consistency in policies such as transhipment; 
4. To maintain tariffs at extant levels; 
5. To monitor the temporary DCCS, the ICTS and its eventual replacement with a CSP, and 
6. To explore export opportunities to the rest of Africa.116  
These provisions tied local demands to external conditions and suggested that to prevent 
undervaluing, transhipment, smuggling and illegal imports, the government of South Africa 
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should improve the capacity of its Customs Offices and collaborate with the SACU as well as the 
U.S. government to ensure consistency in the policies of the three bodies (the government of 
South Africa, the U.S. and the SACU). However, one area that was missing in the provisions was 
the adoption of prudent measures to address the problem of uncompetitive manufacturers who 
sell their certificates to retailers. In addition to this problem, another problem arose in a 
subsequent negotiation between stakeholders in the textiles and apparel industry, which was 
aimed at achieving consensus on the implementation procedures of the CSP. South African 
textiles and apparel manufacturers accused the government of South Africa and the SACTWU of 
sidelining them in the negotiations. The manufacturers argued that “the revision was less „biased‟ 
towards business, and included an emphasis on black economic empowerment while proposing 
to exercise an interim scheme to replace the DCCS.”117 
At the same time that these problems were developing, the South African economy was facing 
monetary problems, in the form of price deflation, the appreciation of the Rand against the U.S. 
Dollar (especially at the end of 2003) and a surge of imported textiles and apparel. The 
combination of these problems led to another restructuring of production and the labour 
component in the textiles and apparel industry. The restructuring was known as the 
Flexibilisation Strategy. In the Strategy, manufacturers reduced both the manufacturing function 
and the labour component of production. Some manufacturers became design houses or 
importers while others downsized, retrenched or casualised workers.
118
 
The casualisation of workers in the Flexibilisation Strategy involved “the externalisation or 
outsourcing of the apparel assembly from manufacturing centres to households and increased 
reliance on previous employees for part-time, temporary or contract work. This serves as a cost 
prevention initiative by large manufacturers or as a livelihood strategy for retrenched 
workers.”119 In this respect, even though the Strategy was a crisis respond initiative, it has 
created jobs for workers who would have otherwise been unemployed. Despite this advantage, 
the Strategy has created job insecurity. Household workers can lose their work at any time if 
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manufacturers contracted out production to other household workers who offer lower 
concessions. Again, the externalisation of production to households has endangered the accuracy 
of identifying the number of employed and the geographical distribution of production sites. It 
has also brought issues related to the accuracy of figures on the contribution of the sector to 
South Africa‟s GDP, which in turn, has stalled government intervention measures to target 
employees, especially in areas of enforcing wage regulation and skills training.  
Paradoxically, the Strategy has also led to the underinvestment in both human and physical 
capital, because the externalisation of production has not added extra cost to manufacturers to 
invest in their employees through internship training and sponsorship. Neither has it increased 
the government‟s responsibility to provide physical infrastructures that would promote 
production. These responsibilities have, however, been shirked in favour of individual household 
workers. 
As a result of the above mentioned problems, the contribution of the textiles and apparel industry 
to GDP, manufacturing output, export and employment have been decreasing dramatically. For 
example, the contribution of the textiles, apparel and leather industry as a percentage of South 
Africa‟s GDP fell from 3.72% in 2000 to 3.04% in 2004.120 When the Rand devalued in 2001 
and plummeted dramatically from $U.S.1 = R6.10 in 1999 to around R12.11 = $U.S.1 in 
2001,
121
 however, the South Africa textile and apparel manufacturers took advantage of the 
situation and expanded their exports, especially to the U.S.  
The devaluation of the Rand coincided with South Africa‟s eligibility for AGOA‟s textile and 
apparel preferential treatment and export incentive programmes, such as the DCCS. These 
provided opportunities for South African textiles and apparel manufacturers to expand 
production and export to the U.S. Due to the devaluation of the Rand and the trade benefits that 
came with it, there were also massive investments in the industry. For instance, in October 2000, 
Ramatex Textiles (Malaysia) invested $110 million in a textile mill and garment factory in the 
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Eastern Cape. In another related development, Frame Textiles (South Africa) planned an 
investment worth $25 million to boost the firm‟s competitiveness and capacity in a bid to 
penetrate the U.S. market more effectively.
122
 However, Table 3 shows that, despite the Rand‟s 
devaluation and the increase in investments and exports to the U.S., the internal problems facing 
the textiles and apparel industry could not be overcome. Exports to the U.S., just like the sector‟s 
contribution to GDP, could not be sustained. The appreciation of the Rand (post 2003, hovering 
between $U.S.1 = R6 – R7),123 combined with external factors like the rules of origin governing 
the textiles and apparel trade under AGOA, the termination of the ATC in 2005 and the global 
financial crisis, exacerbated the problems facing the textiles and apparel industry (see Table 3).  
From 2001 to 2003, South Africa‟s exports of textiles and apparel under AGOA grew rapidly. In 
2003, exports of textiles and apparel peaked at $253,405,062 which represented an annual 
growth rate of 26.7%. However, the annual growth rate of exports of textiles and apparel fell to 
negative 5.7% ($40,893,687) in 2008.  
Table 3: South Africa‟s General Exports of Textile and Apparel to the U.S. in U.S. Dollars 
(2001-2008). 
   Year  
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
Exports 
 
194,887,408 
 
200,019,367 
 
253,405,062 
 
163,881,488 
 
86,476,702 
 
66,742,116 
 
43,379,247 
 
40,893,687 
Growth 
Rate 
 
19.3 
 
2.6 
 
26.7 
 
- 35.3 
 
- 47.2 
 
- 22.8 
 
- 35.0 
 
- 5.7 
Source: U.S. Office of Textiles and Apparel.
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As mentioned above, the appreciation of the Rand and the sale of DCCs to South Africa retailers 
contributed to a deterioration in the textiles and apparel industry. The devaluation of the Rand 
led to the diversion of the proportion of output of textiles and apparel produced by local 
manufacturers destined for the South African market. “Textiles and apparel manufacturers signed 
numerous export orders with U.S. retailers, which promised larger profits than did supplying the 
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domestic market.”125 In response to the diversion of trade, South African retailers depended 
highly on foreign textiles and apparel manufacturers to supply the domestic market. At the same 
time, the sale of DCCS to retailers made such imports cheaper because retailers could earn 30% 
to 40% discount on imported textiles and apparel.  
According to Roberts and Thoburn, the import penetration of textiles alone rose from 27% - 37% 
from 1990 to 2001. Export penetration of South African textiles and apparel to the world market, 
according to Roberts and Thoburn, increased from 16% - 23% within the same period.
126
 This 
means that, within eleven years, textiles imports to South Africa increased by 10% while exports 
increased by only 7%. Notwithstanding the effects of the devaluation of the Rand on trade, when 
the Rand strengthened after 2003, it became expensive for South African manufacturers to 
increase exports to the U.S. At the same time, the diversion of trade and the discounts earned on 
textiles and apparel imported into South Africa had led to excessive competition in South 
Africa‟s domestic market. In a report by the South African Department of Labour, it was 
mentioned that between 2002 and 2005, clothing sales in the South African market from local 
producers fell by 13.4% and textiles sales by 22%.
127
 Imports of garments, according to the 
Report, increased four times from R1, 673 million in 2002 to R6, 898 million by 2006. The 
Report went further to mention that clothing imports from China alone increased from 16.5% in 
total Rand value in 1995 to 74.2% in 2005.
128
  
The deterioration in the textiles and apparel industry can to a large extent also be linked to global 
developments in the textiles and apparel industry after 2004. Up until 2005, the textiles and 
apparel industry was protected by quotas imposed in the U.S. Because of the quota, U.S. retailers 
were compelled to source textiles and apparel from countries such as South Africa., because of 
the preferential treatment given to textiles and apparel made in South Africa. However, when the 
quota system was terminated in 2005, U.S. retailers began to source from competitive and 
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cheaper suppliers in countries such as China, Bangladesh and Cambodia. Again, under the 
AGOA legislation, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) was tasked with 
the responsibility of determining on an annual basis the aggregate quantity of fabric and yarn 
available for production. Exporters from qualifying countries, such as South Africa, were 
compelled, on an annual basis, to source and utilise the annual determination of such fabrics and 
yarn for processing into qualifying exports under AGOA. Failure to utilise these (local, regional 
and U.S.) inputs would jeopardise the future eligibility of downstream clothing products under 
the Act.
129
 Because of the low quality and quantity of yarn and fabric in SSA and the high cost of 
U.S. fabric and yarn, these provisions were later found to be unworkable and repealed on 
October 16, 2008 (Public Law 110-436).
130
 However, before the repeal of these provisions, the 
devastating effect had already been felt by South Africa‟s textiles and apparel industry.  
The problems which came with the termination of the ATC and the provisions governing the 
textiles and apparel trade under AGOA were further exacerbated by the global financial crisis. 
The global financial crisis reduced the purchasing power of American consumers, as well as 
investment inflow into South Africa. These contributed to the decline in exports to the U.S.  
The question that consequently arises is: has AGOA been successful in promoting employment 
and poverty reduction in South Africa? The analysis has shown that the internal and external 
challenges that have been facing the South African textiles and apparel industry since the 1990s 
have been exacerbated by AGOA. The number of clothing workers employed in the formal 
sector who are registered with the South Africa National Bargaining Council decreased by a 
negative 25.7% between December 2004 and August 2007, the period which fell within the 
restructuring of production and labour in the textiles and apparel industry of South Africa, the 
appreciation of the Rand, the imposition of strict rules of origin on South Africa under AGOA, 
the termination of the ATC and the global financial crisis. The number of firms engaged in 
textiles and apparel production also decreased by 13.8% within the same period
131
 (See Table 4). 
                                                 
129
 Naumann, E. AGOA at 10: Reflection on US-Africa Trade with a Focus on SACU Countries, 12, 
http://www.tralac.org/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?c=1694 (Accessed February 25, 2011). 
130
 Ibid., 12. 
131
 Morris, M. and Reed, L.  A Sectorial Analysis of Skills, Gaps and Shortages in the Clothing and Textile Industry 
in South Africa. Department of Labour, South Africa, 22, http://www.labour.gov.za/ (Accessed September 16, 
2010). 
45 
 
Table 4 shows that the South African government‟s poverty reduction strategy and South 
Africa‟s eligibility for AGOA‟s preferential treatment have only exacerbated the problem of 
unemployment and low investment in the textile and apparel industry. 
Table 4: Clothing Manufacturing Employment Strength (2000-2007).  
       Year  
31/12/2000 
 
01/01/2002* 
 
31/12/2002 
 
31/12/2003** 
 
31/12/2004 
 
31/12/2005 
 
31/12/2006 
 
31/08/2007 
 
Firms 
 
702 
 
651 
 
672 
 
1,090 
 
1,169 
 
1,138 
 
1,048 
 
1,008 
 
Workers 
 
69,954 
 
62,712 
 
65,585 
 
95,187 
 
97,958 
 
83,081 
 
74,456 
 
72,796 
Growth 
Rate 
Workers 
  
 
- 10.4 
 
 
4.6 
 
 
45.1 
 
 
2.9 
 
 
- 15.2 
 
 
- 10.4 
 
 
- 2.2 
Source: South African Department of Labour.
132
 
* Figures for 31/12/2001 are not available so the next best from 31/1/2002 were used. 
** From 25/07/2003, a collective agreement was published for the non-metro areas. 
The figures reflected before this date, therefore, are only in respect of „Metro‟ areas. 
 
These programmes are still concentrated on promoting investment and reinvestment in capital-
intensive sectors, such as mineral and energy related products leading to a volatile and negative 
trend of employment in labour intensive industries such as the textiles and apparel industry.  
In addition to the issue of government policy, the rationalisation of operations, investment, 
upgrading of machinery and improvement in management have also contributed to the reduction 
of employment and closure, as well as the relocation of firms. The new generation of machines 
purchased in recent years have much greater output than those they replaced. A new loom or 
dyeing machine may increase production by 50% - 100% over the machines they replaced. This 
means higher productivity and lower unit labour costs, along with reductions in employment.
133
 
In addition to the reduction in employment, the textile and apparel industry has, and remains, 
concentrated in three provinces, namely Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. According 
to the National Bargaining Council of South Africa, as of June 2004, there were 327 firms 
located in the Western Cape, 239 in the Northern areas, 219 in KwaZulu-Natal and 42 in the 
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Eastern Cape.
134
 The Concentration of firms and physical infrastructures in these geographical 
areas have resulted in the reversal of the efforts to decentralise the industry through the  
relocation of firms away from towns, which were formerly hubs of textile activities, e.g. Mooi 
River, Harrismith and Butterworth. The effect has been the creation of industrial ghost towns.
135
    
To summarise, the combination of internal and external problems e.g. a strict adherence to 
AGOA‟s rules of origin governing the textiles and apparel trade have contributed to the 
deterioration of economic activities in the textiles and apparel industry of South Africa. It is 
therefore not surprising that its contribution to South Africa‟s GDP fell from 5.09% in 2005 to 
5.0% in 2006. 
4.4 AGOA and the Cotton-Textiles-Apparel Industry in Kenya 
Although South Africa and Kenya are eligible for AGOA‟s textiles and apparel preferential 
treatment, the experience of Kenya under the Act is different from South Africa‟s. The 
disappointing effects of SAP in the 1990s led the government of Kenya to adopt short, medium 
and long term development plans to curb the increasing rate of unemployment and poverty.  The 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS), which was implemented from 2000-2003, served as 
a short term development plan. The IPRS was replaced in 2003 with a medium term 
development strategy called the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment 
Creation 2003 – 2007 (ERS). The IPRS and the ERS, as a whole, laid the foundation for a long 
term development plan called Kenya Vision 2030. In Kenya Vision 2030, the government of 
Kenya has projected that “Kenya will become an industrialised, middle-income country which 
will provide a high quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030.”136 Short, medium and long 
term development plans also form part of the government‟s efforts to build a market economy as 
well as to promote Kenya‟s continues eligibility for AGOA, because Kenya‟s eligibility for 
AGOA‟s preferential treatment can be terminated if the U.S. President determines that Kenya is 
receding from its commitment to a market economy.   
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As Kenya was eligible for AGOA‟s special apparel rule, the cotton-textiles-apparel industry 
(henceforth referred to as the production chain) was one of the manufacturing industries elevated 
to promote the goals of the country‟s development plan. As already mentioned, the production 
chain is seen as a „strategic sub-sector‟ for every country, mainly because of the economic 
opportunities that come with it, as well as the capacity of the production chain to promote 
technological innovation and industrial linkages (backward linkage with the agricultural sector 
and industries that use cotton-related products, such as cotton seed in making soap). 
To promote industrial development, investment and the quality of life of Kenyans, four main 
principles were espoused in the IPRS and ERS. These include: 
1. Promoting an economy of macroeconomic stability;  
2. Strengthening institutions of governance through capacity building and the rule of law;  
3. Rehabilitating and expanding physical infrastructures and investment in human capital. The 
government called on the private sector, non-governmental and community-based organisations 
to get involved in activities, such as skills training and investment in productive enterprises that 
would improve the human and physical capital needed for economic development. The phrase 
„the private sector is the engine of growth‟ became the slogan in the Strategies;  
4. Promoting a favourable environment for private investment through the elimination of all 
requirements for the Trade Licensing Act, which constrained, controlled, and imposed extra 
costs on businesses without adding value to production. To promote this environment, efforts 
were made to increase the efficiency of Commercial Courts through improving the timeliness 
with which civil cases were disposed.  Drastic steps were also taken to reduce excessive delays 
which add excessive costs to businesses at ports.
137
 
Under macroeconomic stability, four major reforms were undertaken by the government of 
Kenya. First, the government set its priorities to maintain revenues at above 21% of GDP to 
enable the bulk of government expenditure to be financed from tax revenues. Private sector 
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investment, rationalisation of tax rates, broadening the tax base to include informal sectors and 
the modernisation of revenue administration to fight bribery and corruption were considered to 
be the best options to achieve this.
138
 The second measure involved restructuring the 
government‟s expenditure to be more growth and pro-poor oriented. Against this background, 
the government deepened the Medium Term Expenditure Framework process, implemented the 
Country Financial Accountability Assessment Action Plan, Public Expenditure Management 
reforms, and utilised an annual Public Expenditure Review (PER) to inform resource allocation 
and distribution. The third measure focused extensively on deficit financing of nondomestic 
sources to enable the growth of private sector credit. In this respect, the government further cut 
its budget on subsidies. Finally, the Central Bank of Kenya was asked to pursue monetary 
policies consistent with promoting low inflation without compromising Kenya‟s recovery 
effort.
139
  
As a result of these strategies, the Kenyan economy experienced significant growth, especially at 
the Export Processing Zones (EPZs). For instance, Kenya‟s economic growth rate in real GDP 
increased from 1.2% in 2002,
140
 to 7.1% in 2007.
141
 Between 2000 and 2006, investment in the 
textiles and apparel industry at the EPZs increased from Kshs. 1,200 billion to Kshs. 10,317 
billion.
142
 It is also important to mention that, in addition to the government‟s macroeconomic 
stability measures and the comparative advantage Kenya has in cotton production, Kenya‟s 
eligibility for AGOA‟s LDBDCs special rule and other preferential provisions governing the 
textiles and apparel trade under AGOA also contributed to the high investment in the textiles and 
apparel industry. Due to the favourable preferential treatment given to Kenya under AGOA, 
investors were drawn from countries such as the U.S., Britain, China, India and South Africa, 
primarily to take advantage of these opportunities.  
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The comparative advantage Kenya has in cotton production can be seen in the availability of 
suitable land for cotton production in the country. According to the Kenyan Cotton Board, Kenya 
has about 350,000 hectares of land suitable for rain-fed cotton production and 34,500 hectares of 
land suitable for irrigated cotton.
143
 The Board has also estimated that rain-fed cotton production 
alone has the capacity to produce about 260,000 bales of lint annually, whilst irrigated cotton can 
produce 108,000 bales of lint annually.
144
 This means that about 384,500 hectares of land out of 
Kenya‟s 581,679 sq km area of dry land is suitable for cotton farming, with annual lint 
production of at least 368,000 bales. 
Notwithstanding the comparative advantage Kenya has in cotton production and the huge 
investment in the textiles and apparel industry, it is disappointing to say that there has not been a 
correlated investment between the cotton industry and the textiles and apparel industry. This has 
led to low lint production. In 2003, it was estimated that about 25,000 hectares or 7% of suitable 
land was under cotton farming with annual lint production of 20,000 bales.
145
 This fell short of 
the annual domestic demand of 60,000 to 120,000 bales.
146
 As a result of the high dependence of 
the textiles and apparel industries on lint production, low output of lint has had negative effects 
on the textiles and apparel industry. It is therefore not surprising that when the world market 
demand for lint increased in 2005, after the termination of the ATC, which increased textiles and 
apparel production in the world, the number of firms producing apparel in Kenya declined from 
35 (in 2003) to 25.
147
    
Several internal and external factors have contributed to the decrease in the number of firms and 
the low quantity of lint production in Kenya. The first internal factor is the government‟s reforms 
and deficit financing measures under the IPRS and ERS. Under these reform measures, the 
government of Kenya has transferred the duties and responsibilities of state institutions, such as 
the Kenya Cotton Board and Extension Offices, to private traders. This has led to institutional 
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weakness, budget cuts and retrenchment of personnel in the Cotton Board and Extension Offices. 
When the Cotton Board and Extension Offices were “stripped of their role, private agents 
entered the cotton industry especially in primary purchase, sale of pesticides, farming inputs, 
transportation, and ginning.”148 However, “the emergence of these private traders, competing to 
maximize profits, seriously affect quality through undifferentiated quality purchases, and through 
the collapse of the systems through which the government provided credited inputs and 
extension services to producers.”149 
The second internal factor affecting lint production is the creation of institutions such as the 
EPZA, the Cotton Board, the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, the Manufacturing Under 
Bond Scheme (MUB) and the Crop Department of the Ministry of Agriculture to promote trade, 
investment and employment without the establishment of an “apex stakeholder institution or 
rules to coordinate affairs between these institutions and the production chain, or to ensure a 
backward linkage between various stages in the production chain which would provide necessary 
regulatory and cost-reduction interventions.”150 The third internal factor is the lack of incentives 
from the government to stimulate investment in cotton farming, ginning, spinning or the fabric 
stages of the production chain. This is primarily due to the government‟s extreme interest in 
promoting the textiles and apparel industry to the neglect of the cotton industry. Finally, the 
government‟s development plans lack proper policy management (implementation procedures, 
monitoring and evaluation) to improve macroeconomic management and accumulate the 
necessary capital and skills needed for effective, efficient and increased production in the various 
stages of the production chain.
151
  
Due to the low quantity of lint production, there has been a surge in imported fabric, yarn, used 
and new clothes (see Table 5). Table 5 shows that, in 2003, local manufacturers supplied 45.3% 
of textiles and apparel to the domestic market. Imported fabric, new and used clothes accounted 
for 54.7% of the domestic market‟s textiles and apparel supply. It can also be deduced that a 
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significant proportion of the 45.3% of textiles and apparel supplied by domestic manufacturers to 
the domestic market was manufactured from imported fabric. 
Table 5: Kenya‟s Domestic Textiles and Apparel Market (2003). 
 
Item 
Fabric Equivalent (Million Sq. 
Metres) 
 
Market Share (%) 
 
Imported fabric 
 
32.0 
 
17.5 
 
Imported new clothes 
 
38.0 
 
20.8 
 
Imported used clothes 
 
30.0 
 
16.4 
 
Local manufactured items 
 
83.0 
 
45.3 
 
Total 
 
183.0 
 
100.0 
Source: Kenyan Export Processing Zones Authority. Kenya‟s Apparel and Textile Industry – 
referring to the Ministry of Trade and Industry‟s paper on the cotton /textile sub-sector (March 
2004).
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Although the Kenyan market has been flooded with imported fabric, new and used clothes, it is 
important to say that exports to countries such as the U.S. have increased significantly. The 
increase in exports to the U.S. has been facilitated by AGOA‟s favourable preferential treatment 
of textiles and apparel manufactured in Kenya. Under AGOA‟s LDBDCs special rule, Kenya can 
import fabric from anywhere is the world regardless of origin, to manufacture apparel. As a 
result of this rule, the high dependence of the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya on imported 
fabric has not affected the country‟s exports to the U.S. For instance, in 2005, it was estimated 
that, increased investment in Kenya‟s textiles and apparel industry brought the total 
manufacturing demand for fabric to about 225 million square metres.
153
 Though this was met 
with imported fabric from countries such as China, Israel, Egypt and Australia, the final product 
was eligible for AGOA‟s preferential treatment.  
Notwithstanding the favourable preferential treatment given to Kenya under AGOA, the effects 
of external factors, such as the termination of the ATC and the global financial crisis have shown 
that Kenya‟s textiles and apparel industry is still vulnerable because of the low quality and 
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quantity of domestically produced lint. Up until 2005, the textiles and apparel imported into the 
U.S. was protected by quotas imposed in the U.S. Due to the quotas, U.S. retailers were 
compelled to source textiles and apparel from non-restricted countries
154
 like Kenya. However, 
when the ATC was terminated in 2005, U.S. retailers began to source textiles and apparel from 
competitive and cheaper sources in countries such as China, Bangladesh, India and Cambodia. 
The termination of the ATC, as already mentioned, also increased the world market demand for 
fabric and yarn. This affected countries such as Kenya which are not self sufficient in fabric and 
yarn production. The problem of increased market demand for fabric and yarn and the fierce 
competition in markets which provide preferential treatment to Kenya was further exacerbated 
by the global financial crisis, which reduced the purchasing power of consumers and investment 
inflow into Kenya. Table 6 shows that from 2005 to 2008, the success chalked up in the U.S. 
market during the first four years of preferential treatment in the U.S. market began to erode 
because of the internal and external factors mentioned above.  
Table 6: Kenya‟s General Exports of Textile and Apparel to the U.S. in U.S. Dollars (2001-
2008). 
      Year  
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
Exports 
 
44,048,429 
 
64,692,013 
 
125,904,729 
 
187,954,297 
 
277,326,532 
 
271,021,220 
 
263,721,082 
 
249,036,112 
 
246,906,070 
Growth 
Rate 
 
11.6 
 
46.9 
 
94.6 
 
49.3 
 
47.5 
 
- 2.3 
 
- 2.7 
 
- 5.6 
 
- 0.9 
Source: U.S Office of Textile and Apparel.
 155
  
 
Table 6 shows that from 2001 to 2004, because of the favourable preferential treatment given to 
Kenya under AGOA and the quota imposed on textiles and apparel imported from countries such 
as China into the U.S. under the ATC, Kenya‟s textiles and apparel exports to the U.S. increased 
from $64,692,013 to $277,326,532, which represented an increase of 328.7%. This remarkable 
export performance made Kenya the third largest AGOA textile and apparel exporter after 
Lesotho and Madagascar in 2004 (refer to Table 2). However, exports to the U.S. began to 
decrease after the termination of the ATC and the global financial crisis. From 2004 to 2008, the 
rate of export decreased by -11%. The result of such abysmal performance has been the closure 
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and relocation of production of many firms. For instance, in 2008, firms such as Apex Apparel 
EPZ Ltd. and Upan Wasana EPZ Ltd. closed down production. Other firms, such as Global 
Apparel K. EPZ Ltd and Sino Link EPZ Ltd have also subcontracted production to other 
manufacturers.
156
 
The persistent increase in subcontracting and closure of firms and the decrease in exports and the 
quantity of lint production has led to job losses. Table 7 shows that from 2005 to 2008, the rate 
of employment and investment in the textile and apparel industry decreased drastically. 
Employment in the EPZ textiles and apparel industry increased from 12,002 in 2001 to 36,348 in 
2003, representing a growth rate of 202.9%. Within the same period, investment increased by 
159.6%, that is, from Kshs. 1.2 billion in 2001, to Kshs. 9.7 billion in 2003. However, 
employment fell from 36,348 in 2003 to 25,766 in 2008, which represented a decrease of 29.1%. 
Investment also fell from Kshs. 9.7 billion in 2003 to Kshs. 7,578 billion in 2008. It has also 
been estimated that about 140,000 cotton farmers were employed in 2003, which was a very low 
number, compared to over 200,000 farmers in the mid-1980s.
157
 
Table 7: The Impact of AGOA and End of Quotas on the EPZ Textiles and Apparel Industry 
(2000 – 2008). 
      Year  
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
Number of 
Firms 
 
6 
 
17 
 
30 
 
35 
 
30 
 
25 
 
25 
 
22 
 
18 
Investment 
(Kshs. 
Million) 
 
 
1,200 
 
 
3,740 
 
 
6,908 
 
 
9,710 
 
 
8,595 
 
 
9,977 
 
 
10,317 
 
 
8,314 
 
 
7,578 
Number of 
Employed 
 
6,487 
 
12,002 
 
25,288 
 
36,348 
 
34,614 
 
34,234 
 
31,813 
 
28,506 
 
25,766 
Employment 
Growth Rate 
 
 
 
85.0 
 
110.7 
 
43.7 
 
- 4.8 
 
- 1.1 
 
- 7.1 
 
- 10.4 
 
- 9.6 
Annual 
average 
exchange 
rate 
(Kshs/US$)  
 
 
 
 
76.2 
 
 
 
 
78.6 
 
 
 
 
78.7  
 
 
 
 
75.9  
 
 
 
 
79.3  
 
 
 
 
75.6  
 
 
 
 
72.1  
 
 
 
 
67.3  
 
 
 
 
69.2  
Source: EPZA: Kenya’s Textiles and Apparel industry 2005158 and EPZA Annual Report, 
2008.
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In addition to the problems mentioned above, other internal factors, such as the lack of skilled 
workers and low labour productivity, have affected the textiles and apparel industry‟s growth. 
According to Ikiara and Ndirangu, the average textile worker in Kenya requires about 5 years of 
training to attain the skill and productivity level of a similar worker in China.
160
 This means that 
labour productivity is lower in Kenya compared to China, thus making the textiles and apparel 
industry in China more competitive than Kenya.  
In addition to low productivity, the textile and apparel industry has been identified as one of the 
manufacturing industries that lack qualified managers and design experts to formulate and ensure 
efficient and effective coordination in production in Kenya. This problem has also inhibited the 
smooth trade gains of the industry. Ikiara and Ndirangu argue that, notwithstanding the Kenyan 
government‟s short to long term development plans, Kenya has no explicit human resource 
development plan to boost production. They further mention that the mainstream academic 
institutions which offer courses in the field of textiles (Moi University and the Directorate of 
Industrial Training) have not adequately catered for the industry‟s needs through designing 
courses that fit the requirements of the industry. Moreover, they have suggested that corruption 
and bureaucratic delays over migration procedures have affected the hiring of experts in the 
international market who have experience in producing and marketing value-added manufactured 
products for the U.S. market.
161
 These internal problems were further exacerbated by the post-
election violence in Kenya in 2008 which increased the flight of experts and capital from the 
country. 
To summarise, AGOA‟s favourable preferential treatment of Kenya‟s textiles and apparel 
industry has, indeed, promoted and safeguarded the respective industry in Kenya. South Africa‟s 
experience shows that, although economic activities in the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya 
decreased from 2005 to 2008, it would have been worse without the favourable preferential 
treatment given to Kenya under AGOA.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
South Africa and Kenya serve as good examples of the relationship between trade liberalisation 
and preferential treatment on the one hand, and the promotion of poverty reduction on the other. 
The analysis of the impact of AGOA on poverty reduction in the two countries has shown mixed 
results. Using the textiles and apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa as a case study, the 
analysis shows that AGOA has achieved much success in contributing to the reformation and 
integration of the economies of Kenya and South Africa into the global economy. However, 
AGOA‟s success in promoting poverty reduction through economic activities, such as trade, 
investment and employment in the two countries has been mixed. While AGOA has contributed 
positively to promoting and safeguarding economic activities in the textiles and apparel industry 
in Kenya, the economic problems facing South Africa‟s textiles and apparel industry has been 
exacerbated by AGOA. 
The historical analysis of the development of the textiles and apparel industry in the two 
countries has shown that in the 1970s, because of the ISI strategy, the textiles and apparel 
industry accounted for a significant proportion of employment. However, in the 1980s, it was 
realised that the increased budget deficit incurred by the government of the two countries due to 
subsidised farming inputs and credits, the determination of prices of goods below the market 
price by MBs, and in the case of South Africa, the increased agitation of workers in the former 
homelands for good working conditions made ISI costly. Against this background, economic 
reforms were implemented in these countries to transfer development from the state-centric 
approach to a market economy which protects the individual‟s rights to engage in entrepreneurial 
activities. The economic reforms adopted in Kenya and South Africa included deregulation, 
privatisation of SOEs and commercial policies, such as tariff reduction. In Kenya, the promotion 
of these liberal policies led to the abolition of trade union activities and a 10 year tax holiday for 
industries established in the EPZs. South Africa also adopted aggressive tariff reduction 
measures but protected trade union activities. South Africa further gave incentives, such as the 
DCCS to promote exports and investment. However, notwithstanding the promotion of these 
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economic reforms in the two countries, the analysis has shown that economic conditions could 
not improve. 
Against this background, AGOA was adopted to promote poverty reduction in eligible SSA 
countries through trade and investment. However, as already mentioned, the analysis has shown 
that the impact of AGOA in Kenya and South Africa has been mixed. In South Africa it was 
found that, despite the short term success of AGOA, monetary problems like the appreciation of 
the Rand and external factors such as AGOA‟s rules of origin, the global financial crises and the 
termination of the ATC have exacerbated the problems facing the textiles and apparel industry of 
South Africa. The exchange rate – devaluation of the South African Rand against the U.S. Dollar 
– in 2000/2001 motivated South African manufacturers to restructure the proportion of their 
output going to the domestic market. Despite this, the advantages gained in exports from a 
favourable exchange rate and preferential access to the U.S. began to wane when the Rand 
appreciated against the Dollar. On the other hand, the appetite to export combined with reduced 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers and the dubious activities of manufacturers who sold DCCs to retailers 
led to excessive competition and the penetration of foreign textiles and apparel into the South 
African market. From 2004, when the Rand appreciated against the Dollar, South African textiles 
and apparel manufacturers had to compete to recapture their domestic market.  
The problem facing the textiles and apparel industry was, however, worsened after the 
termination of the ATC in 2005, the global financial crisis and AGOA‟s rules of origin 
governing the textiles and apparel trade. The termination of the ATC brought an end to a quota 
system that had been imposed by South Africa and countries such as the U.S. to protect their 
market against textiles and apparel originating from countries such as China. Its termination led 
to a surge of imported textiles and apparel into the South African market as well as excessive 
competition in foreign markets, such as the U.S. which give preferential treatment to South 
Africa. In addition to the termination of the ATC, the global financial crisis limited the 
purchasing power of American consumers and investment inflow into South Africa. The strict 
enforcement of the rules of origin under AGOA also limited South Africa‟s competitiveness 
because South Africa could not import yarn and fabric from cheaper sources outside the U.S. and 
eligible SSA countries.  
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Similar factors have contributed to the deterioration of Kenya‟s textiles and apparel industry.  
Although the export of textiles and apparel from Kenya to the U.S., as well as employment, has 
been decreasing over the years, South Africa‟s shows that the result would have been worse 
without favourable preferential treatments, such as AGOA‟s special rule. For the first four years 
after the passage of AGOA, there was a high inflow of foreign investment in the textiles and 
apparel industry of Kenya. However, the high investment in the textiles and apparel industry did 
not correlate with investment in the cotton industry. Factors ranging from the government‟s 
commercial policies, which led to budget cuts, retrenchment of personnel and services of state 
institutions, such as the Cotton Board of Kenya and Extension Offices, to the creation of 
numerous institutions to promote trade and investment, without the establishment of an apex 
institution to establish rules or coordinate affairs between institutions and to ensure correlated 
investment within the production chain has affected cotton production and the growth of the 
textiles and apparel industry. The Kenyan government has focused its policies extensively on 
investment in the textiles and apparel industry to the neglect of the cotton industry. These 
internal problems were further exacerbated by the post-election violence in 2008, which led to 
the flight of capital and experts who have experience in producing and marketing value-added 
products to the U.S. market. In addition to these internal problems, external factors, such as the 
termination of the ATC and the global financial crisis have also contributed significantly to the 
deterioration of the textiles and apparel industry in Kenya.    
In light of the above problems, it is important that reform measures are implemented to realise 
the full advantage of AGOA. The first act of recourse must come from the U.S. From the 
analysis it was realised that favourable preferential treatments e.g. AGOA‟s special rule have 
been able to sustain and safeguard economic activities in Kenya‟s textiles and apparel industry 
against global shocks, such as the termination of the ATC and the global financial crisis. Such a 
favourable rule can be extended to cover all eligible SSA countries. It has also been realised that 
the continuous amendment of the textiles and apparel provision has promoted uncertainty in 
investment. In this respect, factors such as the constantly changing and short duration of 
AGOA‟s textiles and apparel provisions have made it difficult for manufacturers to develop long 
term production plans. In addition to the short duration of AGOA‟s textiles and apparel 
provisions, AGOA is a non-reciprocal trade agreement. This has left the termination of its 
58 
 
preferential treatment at the mercy of the U.S. Congress. As economic development in SSA 
affects the development of the U.S., the U.S. should move forward and establish free trade 
agreements or reciprocal trade agreements with SSA countries. This will help promote certainty 
and the long term planning of production for manufacturers.  
Notwithstanding the above mentioned recommendations, it is important to say that the impetus 
of poverty reduction in SSA does not rest solely on the shoulders of the U.S., but also on the 
shoulders of governments in SSA. The research found that the textiles and apparel industry, 
especially in Kenya, lacks expertise with the experience in producing and marketing value-added 
products to the U.S. market and the managerial skills needed for production. Such a problem can 
be addressed when the government of Kenya adopts explicit human resource development plans 
to boost production in the textiles and apparel industry. Mainstream academic institutions should 
also be adequately funded to offer courses in the field of textiles to cater for the industry‟s needs 
through designing courses that fit the requirements of the industry. The fight against corruption 
and bureaucratic delays over migration procedures should also be institutionalised to promote the 
smooth operation of industries and access to experts in the international market who have 
experience in producing and marketing value-added products to the U.S. and other foreign markets. 
In addition, cotton production should become a priority in development policies in Kenya and South 
Africa. As the cotton industry has the capacity to promote employment for both cotton farmers and 
employees in the textiles and apparel industry, as well as production in other industries that use 
cotton products, the promotion of investment in the cotton industry should be strengthened in the 
development plans of Kenya and South Africa. 
Lastly, recommendations for further study cannot be overstated. There is the need to direct 
research activities at assessing the impact of AGOA on the quality of life of Kenyans and South 
Africans. Such analysis could explore the impact of AGOA on the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals which include poverty and hunger eradication, gender equality 
and the empowerment of women, reduction of child mortality among the children of workers and 
improving maternal health among employed and retrenched workers in the textiles and apparel 
industry of Kenya and South Africa. It should aim at assessing the impact of AGOA on the 
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standard of living or quality of life of employed and retrenched workers in the textiles and 
apparel industry of Kenya and South Africa. 
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